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'But Socrates' said Hippias, 'how can anyone take laws seriously or believe in them, when often the same 
people who established them repeal and change them?' 
(Xenophon, Memorabilia, 4.4.14.I-4) 
 
Die Lüge wird zur Weltordnung gemacht 
(The world-order is based upon a lie). 
Franz Kafka, Vor dem Gesetz (Before the Law) 
 
 
In 1968, in a review of books dealing with oil concessions of the Middle East, Prof. 
Arghyrios A. Fatouros wrote that a colleague of his was finding it quite difficult to pursue 
his study of the international legal problems surrounding foreign investment "without 
being almost constantly distracted by petroleum fumes".  Fatouros added that 
"problems of oil investments abroad ... dominated to an extraordinary extent the legal 
debate and literature" in the area of "treatment and protection of private foreign 
investment in developing countries".1  Fast forward by more than half a century, and the 
whiff of petroleum is still pervasive – at times, indeed, overpowering – in the (mine)field 
of dispute resolution between international investors and nation states.  Admittedly, with 
the proliferation of bilateral and multilateral investment treaties (―BITs‖ and ―MITs‖, 
hereafter), and the development of "an entirely new body of international law" centred 
upon "the interpretation of investment treaties embodying ambiguous and malleable 
concepts such as 'fair and equitable treatment'", the number of disputes submitted to 
international arbitration soared in the years after Fatouros penned his review.2  Thus, it 
is certainly no longer the case that "most of the few postwar arbitrations worthy of being 
cited in discussions of private foreign investment problems ... relate to petroleum".3  
That being said, petroleum-related arbitrations continue to be in a class of their own in 
terms of both the magnitude of the sums at stake and the complexity of the legal 
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questions at issue, to say nothing of the political explosiveness of the disputes 
themselves. 
 
An excellent case in point are the four arbitrations – two ongoing, and two concluded, as 
of the time of writing – that affiliates of either ConocoPhillips (―COP‖) or ExxonMobil 
(―XOM‖) have brought against the Republic of Venezuela or Petróleos de Venezuela 
S.A. (―PDVSA‖, the country's national oil company), before the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (―ICSID‖) and the International Chamber of 
Commerce (―ICC‖), respectively.  The legal disputes at the core of these arbitrations 
arose from the decision on the part of the Venezuelan government – embodied in 
Decree-Law 5.200, promulgated by the late President Hugo Chávez on February 26, 
2007 – to re-structure certain oil projects, known as Associations, so as to make them 
compliant with the legal requirements applicable to all other companies with oil activities 
in Venezuela, as set out in the 2001 Hydrocarbons Law.4  This essentially required that 
such Associations – in which PDVSA affiliates had not been permitted to hold a majority 
stake – be transformed into mixed companies in which PDVSA affiliates were to have a 
minimum 60 per cent shareholding. 
 
This process of transformation from the association form to the mixed company form – 
referred to as ―migration" in official Venezuelan parlance – neither expelled foreign oil 
companies nor banned private participation in the country's oil industry.  Naturally, in 
order to ensure the continuity of the operations, provisions had to be made whereby the 
PDVSA affiliates involved in the projects would take over the activities and assets of any 
company that did not reach basic agreement regarding the migration of its interests 
within the initial four-month period set out in Decree-Law 5.200 (companies that did 
come to such an agreement had an additional two months to finalise the terms of their 
migration and then submit the resulting mixed enterprise projects to the approval of the 
Venezuelan National Assembly).  In the event, these provisions had to be invoked when 
two companies, COP and XOM, declined to participate in the migration of their interests.  
Thus, on the 27th of June 2007, all COP and XOM assets dedicated to oil exploration 
and production in Venezuela had to be duly taken over by PDVSA.5 
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This decision on the part of these two American companies has been presented as the 
calamitous culmination of a process whereby, through a mixture of bullying and 
unilateral measures, the Chávez administration sought to impose extortionate new 
terms on oil exploration and production activities in Venezuela, which rode roughshod 
over the vested rights of investors.  Chávez's actions, so this story goes, not only led to 
suspension of the transfer of managerial know-how and technology from which 
Venezuela had benefited so handsomely throughout the 1993-2006 period (and without 
which the gigantic resources of the Orinoco Oil Belt would not have been developed) 
but, ultimately, paved the way for the involuntary exodus of foreign oil companies from 
the country and the expropriation without compensation of their assets.  That being the 
case, so this version goes, the aggrieved companies involved were left with no 
alternative but to initiate legal proceedings against a rogue government and its state oil 
company and affiliates.   
 
The picture presented in the paragraph above is drawn in strokes so broad and crude 
that it reduces the conduct and outcomes of Venezuelan oil policy from 1999 onwards 
to the level of a mere caricature.  Nevertheless, the broadcast and print media have had 
no qualms about echoing and amplifying it, while a number of OECD governments – 
most especially, that of the USA – have seemed equally at ease to use it as a premise 
for taking foreign policy decisions with regard to Venezuela.  That such credence should 
be vouchsafed to unproven allegations raised in the context of acrimonious litigation is 
hardly unprecedented in the annals of US foreign relations.  Unfortunately, as on many 
a previous occasion, this facile stance contributes nothing towards understanding the 
real issues underlying, and arising from, a state's exercise of its sovereign powers to the 
apparent detriment of the rights (real or alleged) of foreign investors. 
 
At first glance, one would think that anybody seeking to shed some light on the 
confusion surrounding the re-structuring of oil contracts in Venezuela would be well 
advised not to waste time investigating any of the arbitrations mentioned above.  After 
all, arbitration is meant to be a process that is highly refractory to outside scrutiny 
(indeed, that is one of its main attractions, compared to litigation in an ordinary court of 
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law), and detailed information on ICSID and ICC arbitrations is not easy to come by.  
The Venezuelan oil arbitrations mentioned above, however, are an exception to this 
particular rule.  Due to the litigation strategies adopted by the various parties (but 
especially XOM), there is plenty of information available in the public domain on both 
these legal proceedings and the disputes underlying them.  The key sources of such 
information are as follows: 
 
 Documents associated with the court proceedings whereby XOM sought 
(successfully, as it turned out) to obtain an ex parte attachment of funds (i.e. 
without prior notification to the affected party) of PDVSA affiliate PDVSA Cerro 
Negro in New York (27 December 2007).6 
 Documents associated with XOM's – eventually unsuccessful – attempt to obtain 
in the High Court in London, also on an ex parte basis, a ―Worldwide Freezing 
Order ... [of] up to US $12 billion ... in support of ICC Arbitration proceedings ... 
seeking compensation for losses arising from the expropriation without 
compensation, of the Claimant's interests in the Cerro Negro area of the Orinoco 
belt‖ (January 24, 2008; discharged March 18, 2008).7 
 The partial decision on jurisdictional matters of the arbitral tribunal hearing 
regarding XOM's claims against the Republic of Venezuela, published June 10, 
2010. (Due to the complexity of this case, the members of this tribunal decided to 
bifurcate the proceedings and hold separate hearings on questions of jurisdiction, 
firstly, and questions relating to the legal merits and quantum of damages, 
subsequently.)8 
 The award of the ICC tribunal in the case Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd. v. Petróleos de 
Venezuela S.A. et al.9 
 The award of the ICC tribunal in the case Phillips Petroleum Company 
Venezuela Ltd. and Conoco Phillips Petrozuata B.V. v. Petróleos de 
Venezuela.10 
 Offering memoranda for bonds to finance projects, and other miscellaneous 
materials (notably leaked diplomatic cables from personnel at the US embassies 
in Venezuela and elsewhere). 
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And last, but by no means least, 
 
 Official Venezuelan documents produced in connection with the procedures for 
Congressional approval of all associations between PDVSA affiliates and private 
companies, pursuant to the 1975 Venezuelan Oil Nationalisation Law.11 
 
A propos of these official documents, the 1975 Law barred private capital from 
participating in the essential activities of the oil industry12, subject to two exceptions, one 
being that:  
 
in special cases and if convenient for the public interest, the National 
Executive … may, in the exercise of any of the indicated activities, enter 
into association agreements with private entities, with a participation that 
guarantees control on the part of the State and with a specified duration.  
The execution of such agreements shall require the prior authorisation of 
the [Congressional] Chambers in joint session, within the conditions that 
they establish, once they have been duly informed by the National 
Executive of all the pertinent circumstances.13   
 
 
These requirements for approval and information were expressly established out of a 
―concern that such exceptional cases be covered with great legal certainty and extreme 
control‖.14  And precisely on account of such concern, the association projects between 
PDVSA and its foreign partners gave rise to a paper trail of documents (produced in 
fulfillment of the stringent regulatory requirements mentioned above), which include 
reports by the Venezuelan Executive to the Bi-Cameral Congressional Commission on 
the pertinent circumstances for each proposed project, reports to the Venezuelan 
Congress by this same Commission, the Congressional authorisations of the 
Framework of Conditions for specific projects (published in Venezuela's Official 
Gazette), not to mention the Association Agreements themselves (which also had to be 
made available to the Venezuelan Congress, even though there continues to be a 
widespread misperception that their contents were always strictly confidential). 
 
Such is the level of detail in this material that it is no exaggeration to say that a 
competent specialist in the field of international law would probably not find it difficult to 
reproduce the arguments submitted by the parties to the relevant tribunals (in a manner 
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akin to that by which William of Baskerville was able to visualise much of the second 
book of the Poetics of Aristotle, without ever having had to read or even touch any of 
the poison-laced pages of the sole surviving exemplar of that work).15  An ambitious 
exercise in textual reconstruction along such lines lies well beyond the scope of this 
article, not to mention the capabilities of its author.  Nevertheless, it is still quite possible 
– and not especially difficult – for a researcher with a modicum of familiarity with 
international law to paint a thorough picture of these cases, provided of course that the 
right questions are asked.16 
 
Brief Overview of the Projects 
 
But before such questions can be posed, some background information on the five 
projects at issue in the arbitrations is essential. Known as Petrozuata, Hamaca (or 
Ameriven), Corocoro, Cerro Negro and La Ceiba (the first three involved COP affiliates, 
while the latter two involved XOM affiliates), these projects fall into two separate 
categories.  Petrozuata, Hamaca and Cerro Negro were large integrated projects 
dedicated to the production, transportation and upgrading (i.e. partial refining) of extra-
heavy ("XH") crude oil (very dense and viscous crude oil, heavier than water) from the 
Orinoco Oil Belt, and to the marketing of the resulting upgraded (i.e. synthetic) crude oil 
("UCO") and associated by-products (intermediate feedstocks, sulphur, petroleum 
coke).  La Ceiba and Corocoro, in contrast, were projects focused on conventional oil 
and gas exploration and production activities, undertaken pursuant to so-called Profit 
Sharing association contracts, which were authorised by the Congress of Venezuela in 
1995 to allow private investors ―to explore for oil with no participation by a State owned 
entity‖.17  Key milestones and statistics for each one of these projects are summarised 
below. 
 
 Petrozuata: Association Agreement (henceforth ―AA‖) signed in 1995 (50.1 per 
cent COP, 49.9 per cent PDVSA).18  Total investment: MMUSD 2,500 (COP 
investment: MMUSD 1,250).  Congressional approval: 1993. Commercial startup: 
2002.  Initial capacity: approximately 100 MBD of low gravity (~ 22° API) UCO, 
obtained from processing 120 MBD of XH crude. 
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 Hamaca (Ameriven):  AA signed in 1997 (39.9 per cent COP, 30.1 per cent 
Chevron, 30 per cent PDVSA).19  Total investment:  MMUSD 4,000 (COP 
investment: 1,600 MMUSD).  Congressional approval: 1997. Commercial startup: 
2005.  Initial capacity: approximately 150 MBD of medium gravity (~ 26° API) 
UCO, obtained from processing 197 MBD of XH crude. 
 
 Corocoro:  Profit Sharing Agreement signed in 1995 (32.5 per cent COP, 26 per 
cent Agip, 6.5 per cent Opic Karimun, 35 per cent Corporación Venezolana del 
Petróleo, ―CVP‖, a PDVSA affiliate).  COP outlays: 230 MMUSD.  No production 
at the time of PDVSA takeover.20 
 
 Cerro Negro:  AA signed in 1997 (41 2/3 per cent XOM, 41 2/3 per cent PDVSA, 
16 2/3 per cent BP).21  Total investment: 1,600 MMUSD (XOM investment: 667 
MMUSD).  Congressional approval: 1997 Commercial startup: 2002 Initial 
capacity: approximately 100 MBD of very heavy (16° API) UCO, obtained from 
processing 120 MBD of XH crude. 
 
 La Ceiba: Profit Sharing Agreement signed in 1996 (XOM 50 per cent, 
PetroCanada 50 per cent).  XOM outlays: 180 MMUSD.  No development 
undertaken at the time of PDVSA takeover. 
 
The production and investment figures cited above are very relevant in terms of any 
discussion of the damages being claimed by both COP and XOM (also, because neither 
the Corocoro nor La Ceiba projects were in production at the time COP and XOM exited 
Venezuela, it should be borne in mind that these two projects make a negligible 
contribution to the respective damages claims of these companies).  Furthermore, it is 
useful to bear in mind that, to migrate their interests in the upgrading projects pursuant 
to Decree-Law 5.200, COP and XOM would have had to reduce their stakes in 
Petrozuata and Hamaca, on the one hand, and Cerro Negro, on the other, by 10.1 and 
11.1 percentage points, and 13 percentage points, respectively. 
 
There is one more aspect of the associations that needs to be highlighted at this point, 
given its prominence in all of the arbitration proceedings. This is the fiscal conditions 
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that the upgrading projects enjoyed at the time they were undertaken.  Even before any 
concrete deals had been negotiated, let alone signed, PDVSA had mounted an intense 
lobbying effort to convince the Venezuelan government that unprecedentedly generous 
fiscal conditions (i.e. negligible royalties, no special petroleum taxes), would have to be 
applied to all associations if they were to be made sufficiently attractive for private 
investors.  Thus, the various reports directed to Congress by any of PDVSA, the 
executive or the aforementioned Bi-Cameral Congressional Commission, as well as the 
Congressional authorisations for each one of the associations, all contain language to 
the effect that the projects would benefit greatly from – and hence, should apply to 
receive – preferential royalty treatment from the Venezuelan government.22  Crucially, 
though, none of these documents made any representations whatsoever that this 
preferential treatment would, in fact, be granted.  Moreover, when PDVSA and its 
foreign partners decided to go ahead with these ventures, the Republic of Venezuela 
was not a party to any of their agreements. 
 
As things turned out, a royalty reduction did eventually materialise in the form of a 
Royalty Agreement subscribed in May 1998 between PDVSA and the Ministry of 
Petroleum, and which the Petrozuata, Hamaca, Cerro Negro and Sincor upgrading 
associations all subsequently adhered to.23  Thus, despite the supposedly intimate 
connection between the viability of the upgrading projects and a royalty remission, this 
agreement was only finalised some time after PDVSA and its partners had already 
decided to go ahead with the Petrozuata and Cerro Negro projects, and even after the 
financing for both projects through the issuance of bonds in international capital markets 
had gone through. 
 
The royalty agreement for the Orinoco AAs provided for the royalty obligations of the 
upgrading projects to be assessed at a reduced rate of one per cent (as opposed to the 
prevailing statutory rate of 16 2/3 per cent) from the moment that each upgrading plant 
started commercial operations, until such time as the cumulative gross income of an 
individual project had exceeded its total investment by a factor of three (but in no event 
for a period longer than nine years), whereupon the usual statutory royalty rate – 
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whatever that might be at the time – was to apply once again.24  This particular tax 
break came into being through the creative interpretation of the 1943 Hydrocarbons 
Law, which gave the Venezuelan executive the faculty to reduce royalty rates, albeit 
only with the purpose of prolonging the useful life of a producing field and not to improve 
the start-up economics of development projects.25  This legalistic sleight of hand was 
made considerably easier by the fact that the agreement was signed at a time when oil 
prices were at their lowest since the 1940s (in real terms).26 
 
In addition to this preferential royalty treatment, provisions were enacted to allow the 
participants in all upgrading projects (including PDVSA) to pay income tax under the 
ordinary corporate regime applicable in Venezuela.27  In other words, both the taxable 
income and liabilities of these projects were to be calculated on the basis of the rates 
applicable – and the deductions allowable – to companies outside the petroleum 
sector.28  It is worth pointing out that the projects could have been made subject to the 
income tax rate applicable to non-oil enterprises without their being moved out of the 
petroleum section of the Income Tax Law, but PDVSA insisted that international 
investors would view this as an inferior alternative, and its point of view prevailed.29  
However, the placement of the Associations in the non-oil section of the Income Tax 
Law was, again, not accompanied by any kind of assurance that they were to remain 
there indefinitely. 
 
In the event, from 2000 onwards (and especially after 2003), oil prices began to rise in a 
way that made it possible for foreign participants in the associations to achieve very 
robust returns on their investments in the absence of any preferential fiscal treatment.  
By 2004, international oil price levels were more or less double those registered in 
1998.  Given this radical change in market circumstances, in October 2004, the 
Venezuelan executive disposed that the royalty obligations of the upgrading projects 
would thereafter be calculated on the basis of the 16 2/3% statutory royalty rate.  This 
decision was taken pursuant to the 1943 Hydrocarbons Law, which gave the 
Venezuelan executive branch the faculty to reinstate the statutory royalty rate when, at 
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its sole discretion, the reasons that had justified a royalty reduction being granted in the 
first place no longer applied.30 
 
As oil prices continued to increase without letup, the Venezuelan government (in 
common with many other governments around the world) evaluated further measures to 
limit the windfall profits accruing to oil companies.  Thus, in June 2005, the Minister of 
Energy and Mines announced that the Income Tax Law would be amended to subject 
the upgrading projects to the 50 per cent income tax rate generally applicable to 
companies in the hydrocarbons sector.  These amendments only crystallized in August 
2006, thereby bringing into effect a uniform income tax regime for all companies 
producing oil in Venezuela.  Shortly before that, in May 2006, Venezuela had also 
introduced a uniform 33 1/3 per cent extraction (severance) tax against which royalties 
would be creditable, and assessed on the gross value of all liquid hydrocarbons 
extracted from any field.  Even after these two measures, enacted in a year when the 
international price of crude oil for the first time ever averaged over 65 USD/B, the 
profitability of the upgrading associations was still way in excess of the profitability 
estimates that both COP and XOM had presented to prospective buyers of the bonds 
used to finance all three upgrading projects, and which had been calculated on the 
basis of oil prices which, nowadays, appear ridiculously low.31  In this regard, it is worth 
recalling that the breakeven heavy crude oil price for the Petrozuata project was only 
8.63 USD/B.32 
 
As the migration was unfolding, further adjustments to the Venezuelan fiscal regime had 
to be made in order to keep it abreast of international oil market trends in 2007.  Thus, 
as part of the migration fiscal package itself, a shadow tax was enacted whereby, if the 
sum of gross income levies and income tax paid by a project amounted to less than 50 
per cent of its gross income, a supplementary payment would have to be made in order 
to bring the total government take up to the 50 per cent mark.  And in 2008, with 
migration in the rearview mirror but oil prices reaching both cycle and historical maxima 
(in both nominal and real terms), the Venezuelan government enacted a windfall profits 
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tax targeting income accrued at prices exceeding 70 USD/B for the Venezuelan export 
basket.33 
 
An International Arbitration Primer 
 
At this point, it is advisable to open a parenthesis to give a brief sketch of international 
arbitration procedures, covering the various fora where such arbitrations can take place, 
the rules and principles under which they unfold, the legal nature of the claims involved.  
For anybody wishing to discuss a specific arbitration in the context of the evolution of 
the international dispute regime, this constitutes helpful background information.  For 
the Venezuelan cases at hand, however, such information is downright essential, mainly 
on account of the considerable potential for confusion inherent in the overlapping 
character of claims raised by COP and XOM against the Venezuelan government, on 
the one hand, and affiliates of PDVSA, on the other hand, their positioning in in different 
fora, and their grounding in alleged breaches of radically disparate legal instruments. 
 
In taxonomical terms, the first key distinction that has to be drawn is between 
institutional and ad-hoc arbitrations.  The former take place in established fora which not 
only administer the proceedings under the aegis of comprehensive rules (dealing with 
matters such as the appointment, removal and replacement of arbitrators, or the 
duration of the proceedings, say) but also render practical assistance to the members of 
arbitral tribunals (in terms of timetables, communications, revision and publication of the 
awards, and so on), in exchange for structured fees paid by the parties to disputes.  In 
contrast, ad-hoc arbitrations are administered by the arbitrators and the parties 
themselves, either under tailor-made or general (i.e. United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, ―UNCITRAL‖) rules.  All of the recent international arbitrations 
involving either the Venezuelan government or state-controlled entities (and certainly all 
of the cases discussed in this article) are of the institutional variety. 
 
Within this broad institutional category, one can classify arbitrations according to the 
nature of the legal instruments conferring on foreign private parties the right to take a 
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state and/or its national companies before an international tribunal in the first place.  
According to a leaked confidential cable originating in the US Embassy in Caracas, 
entitled International Arbitration vs the BRV (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela), such 
instruments are as follows: "bilateral investment treaties (BITs), contractual provisions 
providing for international commercial arbitration, and domestic law‖. (This might seem 
like a peculiar document to cite as a background source in a discussion on international 
arbitration, but it is actually quite apposite, given the prominence of other such leaked 
cables throughout the rest of this paper).34 
 
With regard to treaty arbitration, the cable points out that this "refers to arbitration 
proceedings in which the underlying claim stems from a state's alleged breach of its 
obligations under an international treaty -- generally, a BIT.  These claims are 
[commonly, albeit not invariably] submitted to [ICSID]‖.35  Treaty arbitrations can be 
brought against states by investors qualifying as nationals of countries with which such 
states have signed a BIT. (Investors whose home countries have not signed such a BIT 
with a particular country may still claim treaty protection if their investments in such 
country have been structured through subsidiaries incorporated in jurisdictions that are 
covered by a BIT.)  As well as not being subject to appeal, ICSID arbitral awards are 
equivalent to ―a final judgment of a court‖ in all of the ICSID Contracting States.  
Approximately 63 per cent of all cases registered under the ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules concern investors invoking the protection of a BIT, while a 
further 11 per cent have been brought under the aegis of either an MIT (such as the 
Energy Charter Treaty, ―ECT‖), or else a number of Free Trade Agreements (including 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, ―NAFTA‖) which, for these purposes, 
effectively function as BITs.36  In addition, twenty per cent of the ICSID caseload is due 
to specific investment contracts between investors and host-states. 
 
Structuring through a favourable BIT jurisdiction may not even be necessary if an 
investment is made in a country that happens to have in its statutes an investment 
protection or promotion law that unambiguously provides for international dispute 
resolution in a specific forum. In such a case, domestic legislation serves as a unilateral 
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consent to the jurisdiction of an international arbitral (generally ICSID) tribunal and, as 
the aforementioned US embassy cable notes, offers foreign investors ―similar protection 
as BITs, protecting against expropriation or equivalent measures, requiring fair and 
equitable treatment for foreign investors, most-favored nation treatment (MFN) and free 
transfer of investment returns‖.37  Approximately 6 per cent of the ICSID caseload 
involves disputes where claimants have relied on provisions in investment laws of host 
states as the basis to invoke ICSID jurisdiction.38  Such claims can be designated 
investment law claims, in order to distinguish them from treaty claims proper. 
 
The third type of institutional dispute resolution is traditional international commercial 
arbitration, which "refers to resolving commercial disputes between transnational actors 
(whether private parties or states) pursuant to the terms of an arbitration clause in the 
underlying agreement".39  This type of arbitration goes much further back in history than 
investor versus state treaty arbitration, and it is rooted in the common sense notion that, 
given considerations of distance, language and lack of familiarity, parties of different 
nationalities engaged in international commerce will tend to be wary of each other‘s 
respective jurisdictions, and may prefer to resort to a neutral and mutually convenient 
venue and forum to settle their disputes, not least since these will often hinge on 
matters of a technical nature and not involve grand legal principles.  Among such fora, 
the ICC is far and away the most popular option (according to a 2010 survey, the ICC 
accounted for 50 per cent of commercial arbitration cases, distantly followed by the 
London Court of International Arbitration with 14 per cent, the International Centre for 
Dispute Resolution of the American Arbitration Association with 8 per cent, and the 
Singapore International Arbitration Centre with 5 per cent).40  In common with ICSID 
arbitration awards, commercial arbitration awards are not subject to normal appellate 
review.  However, commercial arbitration awards do require additional enforcement 
procedures for their execution; namely, to be confirmed in a domestic court of law (a 
process meant to be greatly facilitated by the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, which calls for signatory 
states – currently 146, including Venezuela – to enforce international arbitration awards 
in their domestic courts). 
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This is as much background information on international arbitration as is likely to be 
required by readers in order to follow the thread of the discussion of the cases at the 
heart of this article.  In this regard, the key points that such readers should keep 
foremost in their minds are the following.  First, whenever reference is made to ICSID 
cases, the underlying disputes pit either XOM or COP (and their affiliates) against the 
Republic of Venezuela.  Second, the nationalities of claimants putting forth treaty-based 
claims may be different from that of claimants putting forth investment law-based 
claims, even though they may all be part of the same corporate group.  Third, when 
reference is made to an ICC case, the underlying disputes involve XOM or COP (and 
their respective affiliates), on one side, and PDVSA and its affiliates, on the other side.  
Fourth, as of the time of writing, the ICC cases have been decided, but the ICSID cases 
are still pending. 
 
Who Claimed? 
 
The analysis of the cases begins with the identification of the specific parties that are 
raising claims, together with their nationalities.  This can readily be done by 
enumerating the cases, starting with the contractual claims (where the nationality of the 
claimants has no bearing on the question of jurisdiction). 
 
1. ICC Case No. 15415/JRF:  Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd. (Bahamas) v. Petróleos de 
Venezuela S.A. et al.  Case filed:  January 25, 2008.  Final award: December 23, 
2011 (henceforth: "XOM ICC"). 
 
2. ICC CASE No. 16848/JRF/CA (C-16849/JRF): Phillips Petroleum Company 
Venezuela Ltd. (Bermuda) and Conoco Phillips Petrozuata B.V. (The 
Netherlands) vs Petróleos de Venezuela.  Case filed: 30 December 30, 2009.  
Final award: September 17, 2012 (henceforth: "COP ICC"). 
 
In the ICSID cases, nationality is a datum of great importance, so the lists of claimant 
entities deserve some additional comment. 
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3. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/27: Mobil Corporation, Venezuela Holdings, B.V., 
Mobil Cerro Negro Holdings Ltd., Mobil Venezolana de Petróleos Holdings Inc., 
Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd., and Mobil Venezolana de Petróleos, Inc. (Claimants) v. 
The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Respondent).  Case filed: October 10, 
2007 (henceforth, "XOM ICSID").   
 
Mobil Corporation, incorporated in Delaware, was the ultimate parent company of 
Venezuela Holdings B.V., incorporated in the Netherlands, which in turn owned 
100 per cent of Mobil Cerro Negro Holdings, a Delaware company which owned 
100 per cent of Mobil Cerro Negro Ltd., a Bahamian company which held a 41 
2/3 per cent interest in the Cerro Negro association.  Venezuela Holdings B.V. 
was also the parent of Mobil Venezolana Holding, incorporated in Delaware, 
which owned Mobil Venezolana de Petróleos, a Bahamian company which held a 
50 per cent interest in the La Ceiba project. 
 
4. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/30: ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips 
Hamaca B.V., ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V., ConocoPhillips Company 
(Claimants) v. The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (Respondent).  Case filed:  
December 13, 2007 (henceforth: "COP ICSID").   
 
ConocoPhillips Company, incorporated in Delaware, was the ultimate parent of 
ConocoPhillips Petrozuata B.V., ConocoPhillips Hamaca B.V. and 
ConocoPhillips Gulf of Paria B.V., entities incorporated in the Netherlands, which 
held interests of 50.1 per cent, 39.9 per cent and 32.5 in the Petrozuata, Hamaca 
and Corocoro projects, respectively. 
 
What inferences can be drawn from the two lists above?  The list of COP entities makes 
clear that the treaty claims were based on the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT (there is only 
one non-Dutch entity in this list, and it is from a jurisdiction that does not have a BIT with 
Venezuela: the USA).41  The nationalities of any non-Dutch entities occupying rungs 
below the Dutch holdings in the corporate chains are of no import, but the presence in 
both lists of the ultimate American parent companies (and the non-existence of a US-
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Venezuela BIT) would be an indication that at least some claims necessarily were 
raised pursuant to Venezuela's Investment Law, promulgated in 1999.42  In other words, 
both of the ICSID cases are hybrids, in the sense that the alleged basis of jurisdiction 
for some of the claims was a treaty, while for others it was a domestic investment law.   
 
How Much? 
 
The aspect of the Venezuelan oil arbitrations that has been the focus of the most 
intense attention has unquestionably been the XOM and COP damages claims, not 
least on account of XOM's audacious ex parte attempt to secure a global asset freezing 
order against PDVSA for the sum of USD 12 billion (an action which could easily have 
brought PDVSA to its knees had it been successful).  This is understandable, given the 
obvious – and potentially momentous – economic implications of these damages 
claims.43  All sorts of immense but not necessarily well-founded monetary values have 
done the rounds, making it difficult for the neutral observer to discriminate between 
figures that may have some connection with reality, and others that have just been 
plucked out of thin air. 
 
At least as far as the contractual claims are concerned, such discrimination ought to 
have been made easier by a 2010 PDVSA offering circular for certain debt instruments 
to be placed with international investors, where the company gave very specific details 
about the COP and XOM ICC arbitrations, reporting the amounts claimed as U$S 
158.38 million and U$S 6.5-7 billion (reduced from an original figure of U$S 12 billion).44  
However, PDVSA's figures were not accorded a great deal of credibility at the time 
(even though the document concerned had to be compliant with the disclosure 
requirements of Luxembourg's securities laws).  Be that as it may, the publication of 
both ICC awards confirmed that PDVSA's 2010 disclosures were, on the whole, 
accurate, and that PDVSA had substantial defenses to the amounts claimed.45  Just as 
importantly, it was also made clear that XOM's claims did indeed undergo a radical 
downward adjustment, despite the fact that the company had submitted an affidavit to 
the High Court in London to the effect that ―the amount of damages payable by 
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Defendant PDVSA will approach U$S 12 billion‖.46  Finally, the publication of the awards 
also made it possible to compare the magnitude of the relief sought by claimants, on 
one side, with the sums that the tribunals eventually awarded both companies, on the 
other.   
 
The results of such an exercise are most instructive.  In the COP ICC case, the final 
amount claimed was U$S 165 million, and the tribunal awarded U$S 66.9 million to 
claimants. (The award has been paid in full.47)  In the High Court of Justice, as already 
mentioned, the XOM subsidiary initially calculated its claim at USD 12 billion, but 
abandoned this figure as soon as the High Court vacated the freezing order against 
PDVSA and eventually cut it nearly by half, without explanation.  Indeed, the way XOM 
went about quantifying damages in the ICC case had a rather cavalier air about it, as 
PDVSA highlighted in its submissions to the tribunal: 
 
it was not clear what amount Claimants expected Respondents to pay, whether it 
was the US$12 billion calculated by Mr. Plunkett [the XOM officer who submitted the 
affidavit mentioned above], the US $10 billion set forth in the Summary of Claimant's 
Position in the Terms of Reference, the US$7.6 billion originally calculated by one of 
the Claimant's external experts, the US$6.45 to US$6.85 billion now claimed or the 
US$5 billion that Claimant requested without explanation or discussion in the summer 
of 2007 for all of its interests in Venezuela.48   
 
It is difficult not to form the impression that this scattergun approach to valuation was 
informed by a corporate sense of entitlement, according to which the proper role of a 
tribunal (or a court of law, for that matter) should be merely to rubberstamp whatever 
claim is put before it by an investor who feels aggrieved.  Ultimately, however, the XOM 
ICC tribunal handed down an award of 908 MMUSD (from which were deducted 161 
MMUSD of uncontested debt owed to PDVSA, leaving an outstanding balance of about 
747 MMUSD).49  This award was very much in line with PDVSA's contention in the 
sense that "the full value of [XOM's] entire interest in the Project ... was less than US$1 
billion, and ... settlement with the Government would have been reached quite easily 
had [XOM] not insisted on receiving exorbitant compensation".50 
 
With the publication of the respective awards, the ICC arbitrations have now been laid 
bare for all to see, but no further analysis on them will be offered for the moment.  The 
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reason behind this is that these proceedings did not revolve around mere contractual 
disagreements between business partners, as commercial arbitrations generally do.  In 
fact, the ICC arbitrations were very much aimed at the Republic of Venezuela (albeit 
through the interposita persona of PDVSA), and are best understood as complementary 
– rather than parallel – judicial proceedings, meant to dovetail with the ICSID 
arbitrations.  Hence, it makes more sense to reconstruct, first, the far more complex 
treaty/investment law claims and, only once this has been done, return to the ICC 
arbitrations in order to show where they fit in the litigation jigsaw puzzle. 
 
As far as the reconstruction of the ICSID claims goes, their magnitude is also the best 
starting point for such an exercise because the monetary value of a treaty claim may be 
a telltale sign of the juridical nature – not the substance – of the breach being alleged in 
a given dispute (in much the same way as, for Sherlock Holmes, Dr. Watson's tanned 
hide and shoulder wound were a giveaway of the latter's military service in Afghanistan, 
but not necessarily of his occupation).  Unfortunately, the exact amounts that XOM and 
COP are claiming before ICSID are not easily ascertainable on the basis of public 
documents.  Nevertheless, there is sufficient information at hand to form reasonable 
ballpark approximations about both ICSID claims.  Such estimates, in their turn, provide 
a good enough diagnostic tool for robust inferences to be drawn about the 
characterisation, in a legal sense, of the type of conduct that these two companies have 
accused Venezuela of engaging in when allegedly committing the breaches that gave 
rise to their respective suits.   
 
The value of the XOM ICSID claim can be gleaned from the company's submissions to 
the High Court in London, where it was pointed out that XOM's ―actual losses far 
surpass[ed] the compensatory formula [subject of the ICC arbitration, and valued at that 
point at U$S 12 billion] by many billions of dollars‖.51  Therefore, throughout the 
remainder of this article, we shall use a figure of ―U$S 12 billion plus‖ in connection with 
this claim.52 
 
 
 
20 
 
Ironically, it is possible to give a rather better estimate for the COP ICSID claim, even 
though this company – unlike XOM – never submitted any evidence in open court in 
connection with its overall litigation strategy.  However, COP's legal counsel in the 
ICSID case let it be known in 2009 that their client was ―involved in what is arguably the 
biggest investment arbitration in history as it battles for the return of the U$S 30 billion 
assets seized by the Venezuelan government".53  This figure also appeared in a story in 
the Oil Daily, which gave additional details about the breakdown of the claim: "Conoco 
is seeking $30.3 billion, comprising $20.5 billion for losses incurred through August 
2008 and $9.8 billion to cover expected US taxes on an award‖.54  
 
These reports are indicative of two points in terms of the legal analysis and 
reconstruction of the claim.  Firstly, since the Dutch entities would not be liable for US 
tax in connection with this arbitration, the tax gross-up claim meant that ConocoPhillips 
Company (i.e. the US parent of these entities) had to invoke the Venezuelan Investment 
Law (again, because there is no US-Venezuela BIT).  Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, the figures indicate that these ICSID arbitrations are not mere differenda 
about the value of the COP and XOM assets that PDVSA took over when these 
companies decided to leave Venezuela, but perforce involve allegations on the part of 
these companies that, in implementing its migration initiative, the Venezuelan 
government took actions that contravened international law. 
 
Of course, the mere fact that an investor has couched a particular claim against a state 
in language that may allow an arbitral tribunal to adjudicate on it in the first place need 
not necessarily mean that the claim will get anywhere, because it may be jurisdictionally 
deficient in a variety of other ways.  As it happens, jurisdictional issues have been very 
prominent in both of the ICSID cases under examination.  The COP ICSID case details 
indicate that Venezuela requested that the tribunal deal with the objections to 
jurisdiction as a preliminary matter (December 2008) but no separate hearings on 
jurisdictional matters were held, as such matters were lumped together with the analysis 
of legal merits and quantum in the hearings held in The Hague over the summer of 
2010 (May 31 to June 13).55  In the XOM ICSID case, however, the tribunal decided to 
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hold a separate hearing to address Venezuela's jurisdictional objections (Paris, 
September 23-24, 2009),  after which a partial decision on jurisdiction was handed 
down (June 10, 2010).56  This decision dealt with the jurisdictional issues not only of 
claims brought under the Venezuelan Investment Law but also with treaty claims.  In 
what follows, we shall examine each one of these aspects in turn, starting with the 
Investment Law claims. 
 
The Investment Law Claims  
 
ICSID arbitration proceedings are premised on states placing their sovereign 
prerogatives in abeyance as far as the matters involved in a specific case are 
concerned, and this is something which cannot be taken lightly (as it touches upon the 
very essence of a state's being).57  It is on account of this factor that ICSID considers 
the written consent of the parties (and, more specifically, the state parties) to be "the 
cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Centre".58  It is not compulsory that such consent 
be expressed in a single instrument – like a BIT containing an ICSID arbitration clause 
or a compromissory clause in an investment agreement between a state and an 
investor – and ICSID considers it perfectly acceptable in principle for states to offer to 
submit disputes to ICSID jurisdiction through the medium of domestic legislation.  
However, this admissibility is always subject to the following proviso: "the one basic 
requirement that any consent clause must fulfill is that it should unequivocally show 
submission to the jurisdiction of the Centre of a particular dispute or class of disputes‖.59 
 
In the case of BITs or investment agreements, this particular requirement is easy to 
fulfill, as such instruments will include an ICSID arbitration clause submitting any future 
disputes between the parties to the jurisdiction of the Centre.60  Domestic legislation, 
however, is subject to vagaries of draftsmanship, legal tradition and content which can 
produce texts that are anything but unequivocal.  To be sure, it is possible to draft pithy 
and succinct formulations of unequivocal consent, as witnessed by Albania‘s law No. 
7764 of November 2, 1993, which stipulates in its article 8(2) that "the foreign investor 
may submit the dispute for resolution and the Republic of Albania hereby consents to 
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the submission thereof, to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes".61  For whatever reason, though, laws containing such clear language are not 
abundant, and most of the cases brought before ICSID on the basis of domestic law 
provisions – starting with the very first one in the sequence: Southern Pacific Properties 
(Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, dating from 1984 – have actually required 
that the tribunals hearing those cases do a fair bit of interpretation on the statutes 
concerned in order to ascertain whether or not they contain an acceptance of ICSID 
jurisdiction.62  The COP and XOM ICSID claims against Venezuela – which allege "that 
Venezuela consented to the jurisdiction of the Centre through Article 22 of the 
Venezuelan Decree with rank and force of law N°356 on the promotion and protection of 
investments of 3 October 1999" – have to be counted among such cases.63   
 
The text of the article cited above reads as follows:  
 
Disputes arising between an international investor whose country of origin has in 
effect with Venezuela a treaty or agreement on the promotion and protection of 
investments, or disputes to which the provisions of the Convention establishing 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (OMGI–MIGA) or the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and national of other 
States (ICSID) are applicable, shall be submitted to international arbitration 
according to the terms of the respective treaty or agreement, if it so provides, 
without prejudice to the possibility of making use, when appropriate, of the 
dispute resolution means provided for under the Venezuelan legislation in 
effect.64  
 
The antagonists in the disputes have offered lengthy explanations about the intentions 
and identity of actual and purported drafters of the law, and about the meaning of this 
clause, especially the four italicised words (which, for all the drafting infelicities of the 
clause, imbue it with a conditional character that cannot really be reconciled with the 
notion of unequivocal consent, in a plain language reading of the text).  What all these 
arguments have in common is that they are both convoluted and complex, and can 
hardly be bettered as vehicles for inducing tedium in the layperson.  For present 
purposes, therefore, explaining them in any detail would be pointless.  Fortunately, 
there is no need to go down this path, not only because the decision on jurisdiction of 
the XOM ICSID tribunal summarizes the key points of the arguments very well but, even 
more importantly, because the members of that tribunal unanimously decided that they 
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could not ―conclude from the ambiguous text of Article 22 that Venezuela in adopting 
the 1999 Investment Law consented in advance to ICSID arbitration for all disputes 
covered by the ICSID Convention‖ and, for good measure, that "if it had been the 
intention of Venezuela to give its advance consent to ICSID arbitration in general, it 
would have been easy for the drafters of Article 22 to express that intention clearly by 
using ... well known formulas".65  That being the case, and since "Mobil Corporation ... 
only raised claims on the basis of Article 22 of the Investment Law and not on the basis 
of the BIT", the tribunal made it clear that it had "no jurisdiction over the claims of Mobil 
Corporation, which will thus not be a Party to the continuation of these proceedings".66 
 
With the XOM ICSID decision on jurisdiction, Mobil's (presumed) tax gross-up claim 
would appear to be in tatters.  However, because the principle of stare decisis 
technically does not apply to arbitral decisions, it would be possible in theory for the 
COP ICSID tribunal to reach a conclusion on this matter that is diametrically opposite to 
that of the XOM ICSID tribunal.  In practice, though, this has become a rather more 
improbable outcome, the likelihood of which will have been further diminished because 
four more ICSID tribunals have subsequently arrived at an identical conclusion (and 
while it may be true that arbitral decisions create no precedent, tribunal members tend 
to pay close attention to the decisions and reasoning of their peers).67  Nevertheless, 
there are plenty who still cling to the belief that it might be possible to secure decisions 
in favour of the investors in other cases.68 
 
To an observer unversed in the arcana of international law, the notion that Article 22 
could still at this point in time be found to be an unequivocal unilateral expression of 
consent to arbitrate may seem preposterous.  After all, purely as a matter of logic, once 
one tribunal (let alone five) has reached the conclusion that a piece of legislation is not 
an expression of unequivocal consent, then surely the one quality that from then on 
such legislation will never be able to shake off is that it is 'equivocal', even if the manner 
in which the conclusion had been drawn were unsound as a matter of law.69  But such 
elementary logic fails to take into account the Kompetenz-kompetenz principle, whereby 
it is for arbitral tribunal itself to decide whether or not it is competent to hear certain 
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disputes.  This principle effectively neutralises tricky questions that might have taxed 
Protagoras in his pomp, such as how is it that in situations where "the scope of the 
state‘s consent may be ambiguous, providing potential grounds for the respondent‘s 
objections to jurisdiction", a consent formulation might nevertheless still be held to be 
unequivocal, after being duly interpreted by a tribunal.70  And such is the scope that 
Kompetenz-kompetenz gives to arbitration tribunals that there are quite a few legal 
commentators and practitioners who are clearly relying upon this principle to propose, in 
all seriousness, that "if a national foreign investment law is not a crystal-clear provision 
and incorporates certain grey areas of ambiguity, it is for the state making the unilateral 
act, who has unilaterally chosen, or chosen to maintain, an equivocal language when it 
enacted the legislation, to bear the risk of such ambiguity".71  If taken to heart by the 
arbitral community at large, such proposals would make it possible to find unequivocal 
consent in a statute not only through its interpretation, but by mere inference from it, 
even though it is an established principle that claimants bear the burden of proving that 
there is a positive basis for consent in any given case. 
 
It goes without saying that this sort of innovative sophistry will do little to assuage the 
ever more widespread suspicion among state parties that the whole investor-state 
arbitration system might be biased against them, a suspicion which underlies the 
―growing dissatisfaction of states with the international arbitral process[, and which] 
looms as a major problem in investor/state relations and requires a critical assessment 
of the future of international arbitration as a means of settling investment disputes‖.72  
This is a topic to which we shall be returning, at length, in the concluding section of this 
paper but, for the moment, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the jurisdictional 
arguments wielded by claimants on Article 22 might have come within striking distance 
of carrying the day can hardly be bettered as an illustration of why the whole system is 
sinking into disrepute.  After all, taken together, these claims amount to tens of billions 
of dollars, and yet the flimsiness of their legal foundations is such that they would never 
have withstood even a modicum of scrutiny in a court of law in the United States, the 
home country of COP and XOM, and key backer and promoter of ICSID. 
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Such a statement might seem adventurous in the light of the strident American 
denunciations of the petroleum policies of the Chávez administration.  Fortunately, we 
have at our disposal statements in which well informed officers of the US State 
Department addressed precisely this question of whether the Investment Law amounted 
to consent to ICSID jurisdiction, in the belief (mistaken, as fortuitous circumstances 
would have it) that their opinions would not end up in the public record.  Their candid 
appraisal deserves quoting in extenso: 
 
the international law firm Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, counsel to I&I Beheer 
and Vestey in their arbitration claims [and ICSID counsel for COP, as mentioned 
before] … speculated … that this law may give rights to ... pursue ICSID 
arbitration, even in the absence of a BIT with the BRV.  (Comment: While this is 
an attractive legal argument … this claim is highly speculative and creative.  
Our reading of the Investment Promotion Law is that investors only have 
rights to ICSID arbitration if they can qualify under a BIT).73 
 
It is hard to imagine a more scathing dismissal of the legal theories underlying the 
Article 22 claims than the "Comment" above, especially in the light of the role that the 
firm mentioned therein has played in promoting this type of claim in particular (and 
investment arbitrations against Venezuela in general). 
 
Further Jurisdictional Issues 
 
One of the salient aspects of the COP and XOM ICSID arbitrations against Venezuela is 
that the parties invoking the protection of the Netherlands-Venezuela (henceforth "N-V") 
BIT are those two well-known scions of Dutch enterprise, ExxonMobil (headquarters: 
Irving, Texas) and ConocoPhillips (headquarters: Houston, Texas).  The perplexity of 
the proverbial person in the street when confronting this fact reflects an understandable 
lack of general knowledge regarding a corporate practice (known as "treaty shopping"), 
which may have been contentious at some point in the past but has now become all but 
ubiquitous; namely, that "absent treaty provisions barring the practice, an investor from 
a non-treaty country may structure its investment through a treaty jurisdiction even 
though it lacks any meaningful connection with it".74  However, the highly problematic 
jurisdictional issues thrown up by the COP and XOM treaty claims do not concern the 
tenuousness of these companies' connection with the Netherlands but, rather, involve 
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both the moment in time when this tenuous link was established and whether there was 
a valid business reason (i.e. not related to litigation) for establishing such a link in the 
first place. 
 
Without going deeper into the specific transgressions that Venezuela stands accused 
of, it is difficult to explain the jurisdictional issues mentioned above.  Having said that, to 
tackle the detail of the COP and XOM allegations at this precise point is not necessarily 
a good idea.  True, it is in the minutiae of these allegations that one finds the elements 
to reconstruct and highlight key features of both arbitrations which would otherwise 
remain hidden from public view (doubtless to the relief of some of the protagonists of 
the arbitrations).  However, in order to identify such features in the first place, it is 
necessary to make reference to aspects of international law which are not necessarily 
relevant to questions of jurisdiction.  For that reason, it is better to restrict the factual 
exposition in this section to a couple of essential points, while pleading for the reader's 
patience and forbearance through the invocation of the Holmesian formula that all will 
be eventually revealed. 
 
The first of these points is that both COP and XOM were non-treaty investors when they 
went into Venezuela, and only sought to acquire treaty protection at a much later date 
by restructuring their unprotected investments into a treaty jurisdiction (The 
Netherlands, in both cases).  The second point is that these companies' treaty claims 
have two dimensions to them, described by COP officers to the US ambassador to 
Venezuela thus: COP "has two basic claims: a claim for compensation for its 
expropriated assets and a claim based on the progressive expropriation of the 
underlying assets ... the claim based on the progressive expropriation of the assets ... 
was on top of the fair market value of the assets".75  The XOM ICSID decision on 
jurisdiction throws additional light on what is meant, in the passage above, by 
progressive expropriation.  
 
The restructuring of Mobil‘s investments through the Dutch entity occurred from 
October 2005 to November 2006. At that time, there were already pending 
disputes relating to royalties and income tax. However, nationalisation measures 
were taken by the Venezuelan authorities only from January 2007 on. Thus, the 
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dispute over such nationalisation measures can only be deemed to have arisen after 
the measures were taken".76   
 
 
As can be appreciated, then, as well as fighting over the quantum of compensation that 
COP and XOM maintain they are owed for the assets they left behind in Venezuela 
(which is what most people believe the arbitrations are about), the two companies, in 
their capacity as "Dutch" investors, are also challenging the right of the Venezuelan 
government to enact and implement the series of fiscal measures recounted earlier in 
this paper.  Venezuela, for its part, has argued that they lacked any standing as Dutch 
investors to bring such a complaint, citing the dates of incorporation of the Dutch entities 
as proof that these were ―created in anticipation of litigation against [Venezuela] … for 
the sole purpose of gaining access to ICSID jurisdiction … [an] abuse of the corporate 
form and blatant treaty-shopping [that] should not be condoned‖.77  This principle was 
enunciated in lapidary fashion by an ICSID tribunal in the Phoenix v. Czech Republic 
case: ―to change the structure of a company complaining of measures adopted by a 
state for the sole purpose of acquiring an ICSID claim that did not exist before such 
change cannot give birth to a protected investment‖.78 
 
Before turning the spotlight of the Phoenix decision on the COP and XOM claims, it is 
worthwhile to put to bed for good the jurisdictional issue raised by Article 22 claims.  In a 
nutshell, the actions that both companies took in restructuring their Venezuelan 
interests belie their own argument that this article constituted an open-ended and 
unequivocal consent to ICSID jurisdiction.  Had COP and XOM genuinely held this to be 
true, they would not have sought the protection of the N-V BIT, as they would have 
been aware that an elementary precept of international law says that, once consent to 
arbitration has been given, it cannot be unilaterally withdrawn.  The fact that, 
nonetheless, both companies proceeded to table multi-billion dollar Article 22 claims 
underscores a rather unfortunate trait of international arbitration proceedings; namely, 
that claimants feel (seemingly, with good reason) that it makes sense to inflate their 
claims through any argument possible, as such abusive conduct seldom if ever carries 
serious consequences, and there is always a chance that a claimant might hit the 
jackpot. 
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We can now turn to the issue at the heart of the jurisdictional controversy in the treaty 
claims; namely the timeline for both the government measures and the restructurings.  
The XOM ICSID decision summed up the latter thus: 
 
Initially, Mobil investments in Venezuela were structured as follows: (i) Mobil 
(Delaware) owned 100% of Mobil CN Holding (Delaware), which in turn owned 
100% of Mobil CN Holding (Bahamas), which has a 41 2/3% participation in the 
Cerro Negro association [and] (ii) Mobil (Delaware) also owned 100% of Mobil 
Venezolana Holding (Delaware) which in turn owned 100% of Mobil Venezolana 
(Bahamas), which had a 50% participation in the La Ceiba Association. 
 
On 27 October 2005, Claimants created a new entity under the law of the 
Netherlands called Venezuela Holdings.  On 21 February 2006, this entity 
acquired all the shares of Mobil CN Holding (Delaware).  Then on 23 November 
2006, it also acquired all the shares of Mobil Venezolana Holding (Delaware).  
The Dutch holding company was thus inserted into the corporate chain for 
the Cerro Negro and La Ceiba projects.79 
 
The highlighted dates are of critical importance in the context of what the tribunal heard 
had been Mobil's reactions to some of the Venezuelan fiscal measures recounted 
before: 
 
In two letters dated 5 February 2005, and 18 May 2005 … Claimants first 
complained of the increase from 1% to 16 2/3% of the royalties decided by 
Venezuela for the Cerro Negro and La Ceiba projects … Then, on 20 June 2005, 
[Claimants] informed the Venezuelan authorities that the recent ministerial 
decision to increase the royalties to 30% ‗has broadened the investment dispute‘ 
… They stated that the introduction of a bill that would increase income tax rates 
from 34% to 50% would further broaden that dispute.80 
 
As can be appreciated, then, the XOM restructuring is highly problematic in the context 
of the Phoenix decision because, as Venezuela repeatedly told the tribunal, ―the 
disputes were not only foreseeable, but … had actually been identified and notified to 
Respondent before the Dutch company was even created‖.81  Indeed, in a meeting held 
as early as September 2006, ExxonMobil Venezuela President Tim Cutt told the US 
ambassador that he had personally notified the Viceminister for Hydrocarbons that XOM 
already had already run up a tab against Venezuela for ―USD 2 billion in claims‖.82 
 
As far as COP is concerned, similar evidence suggests that its restructuring resembled 
closely that of the XOM entities, as regards both to chronology and motivation.  It comes 
in the form of a confidential cable reporting a meeting held in Caracas on 30 January 
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2007 between COP officials and the US ambassador to Venezuela, on the subject of 
"the state of negotiations on compensation for [COP's] expropriated assets in 
Venezuela".  The cable says that ―when the Ambassador asked about [COP]‘s 
corporate structure in Venezuela, the executives replied that [COP] incorporated its 
subsidiaries last year [i.e. sometime in 2006] as Dutch companies in order to take 
advantage of the Dutch [BIT].  [COP] executives told Petatt [Petroleum attaché] that 
they had already taken administrative steps to preserve their arbitration rights‖.83  Thus, 
the restructurings of the Venezuelan interests of both COP and XOM seem to fall foul of 
one of the prima facie tests of potential treaty abuse, in that there was no reasonable 
business explanation behind them, other than that of gaining access to a favourable 
forum for litigation. 
 
Having weighed the factors mentioned above, the XOM ICSID tribunal reached what 
would appear to be a damning conclusion in the light of Phoenix: ―the main if not the 
sole purpose of the restructuring was to protect Mobil investments from adverse 
Venezuelan measures in getting access to ICSID arbitration through the Dutch-
Venezuela BIT‖.84 However, the tribunal also opined that a five-minutes-to-midnight 
restructuring along such lines could still, nevertheless, be either "'legitimate corporate 
planning' as contended by the Claimants or an 'abuse of right' as submitted by the 
Respondents. It depends upon the circumstances in which it happened".85  Then, the 
tribunal proceeded to finesse the thorny issue of the potentially ―abusive manipulation of 
the system of international investment protection under the ICSID Convention and the 
BITs" by taking the line that minimal maintenance capital expenditures in the Cerro 
Negro project amounted to ―new and important investments ... [being] projected and 
made‖ and, that being the case, XOM was – subsequent to the restructuring – entitled 
to enjoy all the rights that any other bona fide Dutch investor would have had.86  Of 
course, such rights could not have existed before the XOM Dutch entities came into 
being so, for this reason, the tribunal only accepted jurisdiction ―with respect to any 
dispute born after 21 February 2006 for the Cerro Negro project and after 23 November 
2006 for the La Ceiba project, and in particular with respect to the pending dispute 
relating to the nationalisation of the investments‖.87 
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 At first glance, the XOM ICSID jurisdiction decision amounts to significant setback not 
only for this claimant, but also for others in comparable positions (notably COP).  After 
all, while it is true that the decision may reflect a rather more expansive view of 
jurisdiction compared to the one that prevailed in Phoenix, it also seemed to set aside 
the very large fiscal claims antedating the restructuring.  Nevertheless, the decision has 
still been perceived in some quarters as a victory for XOM because the case continued. 
 
One fundamental question raised by both the COP and XOM cases is how it was 
possible for the companies involved to behave in a manner that is wholly at odds with 
their usual patterns of conduct (notably in terms of their apparent neglect to have all 
conceivable ―i‘s‖ dotted and ―t‘s‖ crossed on the legal front), making their investments 
without treaty protection from the start.  If one reflects on this question starting from the 
assumption that both COP and XOM were – and remain – very experienced and 
sophisticated international investors who would not have let any obvious loose ends 
untied, a hypothesis arises that may account for their apparent indolence towards 
protecting their investments through a treaty suggests itself. Perhaps neither COP nor 
XOM was especially bothered about structuring through a BIT jurisdiction because both 
companies had actually secured a different sort of protection mechanism, which they 
felt was more effective and predictable, as well as quicker and less cumbersome than 
arbitration?  The reader is asked to keep this possibility in mind throughout the 
discussion in the following section, which deals with the fine detail of the treaty claims 
that COP and XOM have put forward against Venezuela. 
 
The Treaty Claims  
 
There is a widespread perception that the main reason why the migration of association 
projects in Venezuela ended up in litigation was that Venezuela insisted on paying book 
value for the COP and XOM assets that PDVSA took over, whereas the companies 
refused to receive anything less than full market value for such assets.88  As it happens, 
this narrative of events has no factual basis, but its enduring hold on the public 
imagination has been due, in no small part, to the succession of misleading statements 
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that claimants have been putting out on the issue of compensation from the moment 
that negotiations between the parties broke down for good, and of which the following 
constitutes an excellent example: ―the ICSID dispute is not over Venezuela's right to 
expropriate the assets of our Venezuelan affiliate, Mobil Cerro Negro … The dispute is 
over Venezuela's failure to meet its obligation under international law to pay 
compensation based on fair market value of the expropriated investment‖.89  In fact, the 
COP and XOM ICSID disputes most certainly are about the right of the Venezuelan 
government to expropriate the assets of these companies and, indeed, about its right to 
enact other public policy measures in the exercise of prerogatives which other 
governments in the world – not least those counted as among the shrillest critics of the 
Chávez administration – would see as being both inherent and essential to their own 
status as sovereigns. 
 
In order to explain how, by means of legalistic sleights of hand, COP and XOM would in 
effect have the Venezuelan government stripped of its sovereign powers by arbitration 
tribunals (all the while professing not to be putting such powers into question), we have 
to start by looking at the treaty which Venezuela is alleged to have violated.  The 
relevant provision is Article 6 of the N-V BIT, which reads thus:  
 
Neither Contracting Party shall take any measures to expropriate or nationalise 
investments of nationals of the other Contracting Party or take measures having an 
effect equivalent to nationalisation or expropriation with regard to such investments, 
unless … the measures are taken in the public interest and under due process of law 
… are not discriminatory or contrary to any undertaking which the Contracting Party 
taking such measures may have given … [and] are taken against just compensation. 
 
The article goes on to define this just compensation as ―the market value of the 
investments affected immediately before the measures were taken or the 
impending measures became public knowledge, whichever is the earlier … paid and 
made transferable, without undue delay, to the country designated by the claimants 
concerned … in any freely convertible currency accepted by the claimants‖. 
 
A number of questions arise in connection with the dispositions of this article, in the light 
of some of the details revealed thus far about the claims.  Where, for example, does the 
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article mention that just compensation should include the taxes on such a payment 
which may be levied in some other jurisdiction (i.e. a tax gross-up)?  And if the quantum 
of compensation depends on the market value of the asset on the eve of a 
nationalisation measure (and, with regard for future income streams, on price forecasts 
current at the time the measure was taken), how is it possible to arrive at a valuation of 
USD 12+ billion or USD 30 billion for the XOM and COP projects (respectively), on the 
basis of crude oil price forecasts available in July 2007 (rather modest in comparison to 
those that have come after the oil price spike of 2008) and/or taking into consideration 
the fiscal regime in place at the time Venezuela announced the migration initiative?90  
Furthermore, how is it that COP‘s counsel declared that their client was bringing suit for 
losses supposedly incurred after COP left Venezuela?  And what should one make of 
the briefing on compensation negotiations that COP officers gave the US ambassador 
in Caracas in April 2008, in which they pointed out that, firstly, ―given the recent 
increase in oil prices, the fair market value of the [expropriated] assets ha[d] increased‖ 
and, secondly, that ―as for the claim based on the progressive expropriation of the 
assets … [COP had] proposed a settlement number … [but] also plan[ned] on 
increasing the settlement number for the second claim due to recent increases in oil 
prices‖?91 
 
The key to all of these questions lies in the distinction between lawful and unlawful 
nationalisations, because customary international law establishes that investors affected 
by the latter type of measure are entitled to receive not only compensation but 
reparations, in the form of the full restitution of their property (or its value at the time of 
taking) plus damages for any increase of the value of the property between the date of 
the nationalisation and the date when a judicial authority handed down a decision 
branding said nationalisation as unlawful.92  This principle of reparation was summed up 
in the seminal Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów: 
 
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act . . . is that 
reparation must, so far as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of the illegal 
act and reestablish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if 
that act had not been committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, 
payment of a sum corresponding to the value which a restitution in kind would bear; 
 
 
33 
 
the award, if need be, of damages for loss sustained which would not be covered by 
restitution in kind or payment in place of it—such are the principles which should 
serve to determine the amount of compensation due for an act contrary to 
international law.93 
 
In other words, reparations entail that the affected party be placed in the position it 
would have enjoyed all along but for the intromission of the unlawful measures, with 
valuation of the assets involved being carried out on the date when a court or tribunal 
found in favour of the affected claimant (and not when the taking occurred). 
 
These reflections lead straight to a series of fundamental questions: on what grounds, 
precisely, can the Venezuelan measures be held to have contravened the dispositions 
of the N-V BIT cited above?  Is it that they were not taken in the public interest and 
under due process of law? Or were they discriminatory or contrary to an undertaking 
which Venezuela may have given to COP and XOM? Or is it that perhaps the measures 
were not taken against just compensation?  
 
Given that the migration process was an industry restructuring, and not violative of any 
specific undertaking not to nationalise, the key issue under the N-V BIT expropriation 
provisions is compensation.  There is no question that compensation is due.  But the 
Chorzów Factory decision itself indicates that, if lack of compensation is the only issue, 
there is no basis for changing the valuation date under customary international law.  In 
addition, one can wonder why that question is even relevant if the treaty itself provided 
the standard of compensation and points to valuation as of a time immediately prior to 
the nationalisation.  
 
The issue of compensation, or lack thereof, can also be examined in light of the now 
published information on the facts.  According to both COP and XOM, the measures at 
issue in their respective ICSID arbitrations constitute particularly egregious examples of 
expropriation without compensation.  In the words of the principal memorial which XOM 
submitted to the ICC tribunal, notwithstanding the ―use [of] euphemisms – such as 
‗migration to a mixed enterprise‘ or Mobil CN‘s supposed refusal refusal ‗to confor[m] its 
activities to the existing regulatory framework‘ … [it] cannot [be] conceal[ed] … that the 
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[Venezuelan] Government seized Mobil CN‘s entire interest in the joint venture without 
paying compensation‖.94  However, while no compensation was paid to either COP or 
XOM in consideration for the loss of their Venezuelan interests before these companies 
filed for ICSID arbitration, this sort of situation is an understandable – not to mention 
common – occurrence where there exists a wide gap between the stances on valuation 
of private and governmental actors (and such a value gap is very much in evidence in 
the cases at hand).95  In the historical record of international arbitration, there are many 
examples of nationalisation measures where no compensation had been agreed upon 
by the time arbitration proceedings were launched.  With such cases in mind, Reinisch 
wrote that 
a number of investment tribunals have dealt with the question whether the 
compensation requirement demands that compensation has actually been paid. In 
this context, tribunals have consistently held that an offer of compensation or other 
provision for compensation, in particular where the exact amount may still be in 
controversy, is enough to satisfy this legality requirement.  Thus, the mere fact that 
compensation has not yet been paid does not render an expropriation illegal.96   
 
Moreover, the presumption that an expropriation may be unlawful due to an ongoing 
non-payment of compensation is even less warranted when a state has shown a 
demonstrable willingness to engage in good faith negotiations to reach an agreement 
with the affected parties.97  Indeed, it is even possible to point to cases where 
expropriation measures have been held to be lawful although no offer to compensate 
the affected parties was made, let alone any indemnification paid.98 
 
It is not difficult to understand why states are not under an obligation to come to an 
agreement with parties affected by a nationalisation measure regarding the quantum of 
compensation owed to the latter, and much less by a given deadline (before a filing for 
arbitration is made, say).  Quite simply, such an obligation would constitute a powerful 
lever whereby private parties could blackmail states into acquiescing to their proposed 
settlement terms, no matter how exorbitant these were.  In this regard, it is worth noting 
that the XOM ICC tribunal was told that XOM‘s approach to negotiating a compensation 
figure for its Venezuelan interests simply consisted in tabling a ―take-it-or-leave-it 
demand for US$5 billion‖.99 
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Although neither COP nor XOM deny participation in discussions on compensation with 
the Venezuelan government, they insist that Venezuela never made a settlement offer 
that complied with the exigencies of the N-V BIT, which provides for the ―market value 
of the investments affected‖ as the standard of compensation.  In public, both 
companies have consistently maintained that Venezuela only ever offered them book 
value for their expropriated assets.100  There is, however, evidence available in the 
public record which undermines the credibility of such statements. 
 
First of all, when XOM petitioned the High Court in London to maintain the worldwide 
freeze on PDVSA‘s assets (obtained by virtue of a dawn raid in which the judge who 
granted a provisional freeze was assured of the clear and present danger that PDVSA 
might quickly dissipate its worldwide assets in a way that would not make it possible for 
XOM to collect on a supposedly cast-iron USD 12 billion claim), the argument was 
made time and time again that the legal dispute which made the attachment imperative 
had come about as a result of the ―expropriation ‗without compensation‘ by the 
government of Venezuela through a nationalisation decree‖.101  However, the High 
Court was also told by PDVSA that XOM had been offered a very substantial sum in 
compensation for its interests.102  In dismissing XOM‘s petition on all points of law at 
issue, Walker J. made the following observation regarding XOM‘s allegations: ―I doubt 
… this can be properly be described as a case involving a lack of compensation‖.103  
Obviously, Walker J. was not asked to adjudicate on this particular matter.  
Nevertheless, in deciding whether to confirm an injunctive relief measure only very 
seldom granted in the absence of manifest fraud, Walker J. had to consider the 
argument that, given the allegedly confiscatory nature of the expropriation and the XOM 
position that ―the commercial interests of PDV and Venezuela … were 
indistinguishable‖, the case before him might be tinged by ―concerns akin to those which 
arise in cases of fraud‖.104  Walker J. found XOM‘s arguments lacking in merit. 
 
When he handed down his reasons for lifting the worldwide freezing order, Walker J. 
also gave a précis of the oil policy of the Chávez government which is remarkable both 
for its concision and its tone: "there has been a change of government since the 
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Association Agreement was made.  The new government strongly disagrees with 
previous policy.  It has condemned the previous policy, and spoken of the need for 
change, in strong terms.  [This]... has not prevented the negotiation of mutually 
acceptable arrangements with the vast majority of foreign oil interests".105  And it is 
precisely these ‗mutually acceptable arrangements‘ which further undermine the COP 
and XOM allegations of expropriation without compensation and/or compensation not 
undertaken in accordance with the N-V BIT standard.   
 
As a consequence of the migration initiative, for example, Statoil and Total had to 
diminish their respective stakes in the Sincor upgrading project (by 16.77 percentage 
points and 5.323 percentage points, respectively), in order to accommodate an 
increased shareholding for CVP.  A confidential cable from the US embassy in Caracas 
recounts a meeting held on 12 September 2007 between ―Petroleum Attaché (Petatt) … 
[and] Statoil Venezuela President Thore Kristiansen … to discuss the terms of the 
Sincor migration to a PDVSA-controlled joint venture‖.106  Kristiansen ―would not state 
the amount of the compensation … [but] implied that it was well above book value, 
which was PDVSA's opening offer‖.  For good measure, ―[h]e stated [that] Statoil would 
have refused to migrate its interest if it had only received book value‖.  The 
compensation paid to the Sincor partners came to USD 1.1 billion, a figure which puts 
the gigantic COP and XOM damages claims into perspective, given that the Sincor 
upgrader was much larger than any of the Petrozuata, Hamaca or Cerro Negro 
upgraders.  
 
Separately, when ―Chevron Latin America president Ali Moshiri (strictly protect 
throughout) met with the Ambassador on June 28 [2007]‖, he was at pains to point out 
that ―Chevron [had] received ‗fantastic‘ terms  for the migration of the Hamaca strategic 
association to a PDVSA-controlled joint venture … [and] added [that] Chevron just kept 
what it had and ‗could have had more‘‖.107  Faced with seemingly incontrovertible 
evidence that, at least in some cases, the standard of compensation had definitely not 
been book value, US Ambassador Patrick Duddy could only conclude that Venezuela 
must have ―offered widely varying terms to at least some of the six companies that 
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invested in the Faja strategic associations‖, since he was not prepared to call into 
question that ―[b]oth ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips stated the BRV has consistently 
stated it would only compensate them based on the book value of their investments‖.108 
 
Numerous other conversations between company officials and US embassy personnel 
in Caracas (including Ambassador Duddy) are relevant (judging by the number of 
published Wikileaks cables, XOM officials met with US embassy personnel more often 
than their COP counterparts but, true to corporate form, the former tended to play their 
cards closer to their chest).  According to a confidential cable recounting a conversation 
with Ambassador Duddy in April 2008, on the subject of compensation, COP‘s 
President for Strategy, Integration, and Specialty Businesses, Greg Goff, explained that 
―the BRV ha[d] accepted that fair market value … [as] the standard for the first claim‖, 
and had ―moved away from using book value as the standard for compensation and … 
agreed on a fair market methodology with discount rates for computing the 
compensation for the expropriated assets‖.  Goff also pointed out that COP had 
―proposed a settlement number and the BRV appear[ed] to be open to it‖.109  However, 
in 2008 the value gap widened on account of COP‘s belief that, ―given the recent 
increase in oil prices, the fair market value of the assets ha[d] increased‖.110 
 
Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET): General Considerations  
 
It is no exaggeration to say that FET, rather than expropriation proper, has become the 
heart and soul of investor-state arbitration.  As Picherack points out, FET ―has been 
invoked more than any other standard of international investment law as the basis for 
awarding damages against States, and tribunals are increasingly willing to grant 
significant damage awards for failure to accord fair and equitable treatment even where 
they find that no expropriation or discrimination of a foreign investor's investment has 
occurred‖.111  For a concept on which so much seems to be riding (or perhaps precisely 
because of this), FET has proved to be remarkably malleable and elastic and, like 
beauty, very much in the eye of the beholder.  Needless to say, these are not desirable 
attributes in a judicial environment, and they go a long way towards explaining why, in 
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Picherack‘s view, ―the decisions and reasoning of many recent tribunals as to the [FET] 
standard's scope and content are fragmented, inconsistent and conflicting‖.112  This, in 
turn, has encouraged the unbridled exercise of creative advocacy, with many legal 
practitioners seemingly acting on the assumption that, ―if only properly argued, it will be 
possible to identify one or more aspects, individually or combined, which may amount to 
… [a] violation" of FET.113 
 
This is not the place to discuss the voluminous literature on the specialist debate 
surrounding the topic of FET in investment arbitration.114  For the purposes of this 
paper, suffice it to say that the international arbitration system – whose explicit raison 
d'être, after all, is investment protection – has been perceived to be tilted in favour of 
investors, as evidenced by a string of important decisions where, in the opinion of many, 
tribunals have ―elicit[ed] obligations from an autonomous interpretation of the standard 
and then proclaim[ed] that such requirements are in accordance with the minimum 
standard under international law, with no apparent justification for such conclusions, and 
often with reasoning … frankly disconnected from the minimum standard‖.115  State 
parties have expressed ―considerable concern about the broad-reaching interpretations 
given to the [FET] standard by recent tribunal awards‖, particularly with regard to the 
way in which "some very prominent arbitrators have little difficulty in finding new norms 
of customary international law" (while displaying no reservations about the seemingly 
oxymoronic nature of this enterprise or, indeed, its grave political implications).116   
 
The intensity of disquiet in state quarters can best be gauged not so much by the 
withdrawal from ICSID of states like Ecuador, Bolivia and Venezuela (or by the threats 
from Argentina and Nicaragua to follow suit) but, rather, from recent actions and 
statements of some governments that can be counted among the staunchest supporters 
of international dispute resolution structures.  As far back as 2001, the three NAFTA 
signatories (led by the USA) had already felt impelled to issue a clarification that the 
FET standard in Article 1105 of NAFTA did ―not require treatment in addition to or 
beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of 
treatment of aliens‖.117  In 2011, a committee of the European Parliament on 
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international trade recommended (citing the NAFTA precedent) that the European 
Union should ―include in all its future agreements a specific clause laying down the right 
of the EU and [Member States] to regulate‖, and that ―standards of protection should be 
strictly defined, in order to avoid abusive interpretations by international investors.  In 
particular … fair and equitable treatment must be defined on the basis of the level of 
treatment established by international customary law‖.118  For its part, Australia, which 
found itself hauled before an arbitration tribunal on account of public health disposition 
affecting the marketing of cigarettes, has stated that it will no longer seek ―the inclusion 
of investor-state dispute resolution procedures in trade agreements with developing 
countries at the behest of Australian businesses‖.119  And the ultimate litmus test of 
whether FET has become the equivalent of Frankenstein‘s monster even for capital-
exporting countries may not now be long in coming: Germany – signatory of the first 
ever BIT in history (1956, with Pakistan) and the country that has subscribed the largest 
number of such treaties (over 130 at the latest count) – has recently been taken to 
ICSID arbitration by Swedish utility company Vattenfall over alleged FET violations of 
the ECT, attributable to the parliamentary decision to phase out nuclear power 
generation in the wake of the Fukushima disaster in Japan.120  Thus far, and in sharp 
contrast to  
 
other industrialized countries like the United States, Canada, and Australia [which] 
have decided to alter their approach to international investment treaties (including 
with regard to transparency, definitions and dispute settlement procedures), the 
German federal government continues to insist on secrecy in relation to treaty 
negotiations and dispute settlement procedures and on very far reaching and broadly 
formulated definitions and investment protection clauses.121 
 
However, it will be most interesting to see whether the latest Vattenfall ICSID 
proceedings put a dent on the hitherto blasé stance of the German Federal government 
with regard to FET issues (not least in view of the strength of the German Green 
movement, which will take great exception to any challenge to the phasing out of 
nuclear power generation).122  Among other things, the unfamiliar experience of having 
now twice found itself on the ICSID dock might lead the German government to 
reconsider its initiative to re-negotiate its older BITs in order to incorporate in them 
provisions giving investors the right to sue governmental parties.123 
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The above reflections are meant to give to the non-specialist reader an idea of the many 
interpretations which can be ascribed to the brief passage in the protocol to the N-V BIT 
where FET is addressed: ―the Contracting Parties agree that the treatment of 
investments shall be considered to be fair and equitable … if it conforms to the 
treatment accorded to investments of their own nationals, or to investment of nationals 
of any third State, whichever is more favorable to the national concerned, as well as to 
the minimum standard for the treatment of foreign nationals under international law‖.124  
Now, there is no point in speculating about the gamut of colourable claims that could be 
advanced in connection with each and every one of the actions that the Venezuelan 
government took between 2004 and 2007, depending on whether one were to look at 
such actions through the prism of a broad or, alternatively, a narrow interpretation of the 
FET standard.  For the purposes of this analysis, we will consider these actions from the 
standpoint of an expansive FET standard.  This means an FET perspective according 
to which certain manifestations of governmental conduct, even though carried out in 
good faith, might still conceivably breach the standard.  Such a perspective falls short of 
the extreme fundamentalist position – rejected in the texts of legal authorities and very 
seldom espoused openly even by investors but, in practice, often argued behind closed 
doors before arbitration tribunals – which sees a source of potential liability in any 
regulatory or tax measure taken by a state that may affect a foreign investor. 
 
If the Venezuelan government measures were being evaluated on the basis of the 
minimum standard of treatment of aliens, all that would be required to give these 
measures a clean bill of health, FET-wise, would be that they not involve any bad faith, 
gross misconduct, manifest injustice, an outrage, or a willful neglect of duty.  Satisfying 
a more expansive FET standard, however, poses additional requirements; to wit, the 
measures should not have frustrated any legitimate expectations that the investors 
might have harboured when they made the investment. 
 
It is a well settled matter that ―the determination of a breach of the obligation of ‗fair and 
equitable treatment‘ by the host State must be made in the light of the high measure of 
deference that international law generally extends to the right of domestic authorities to 
regulate matters within their own borders‖.125  Such deference is especially marked with 
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regard to taxation, as this is considered a quintessential sovereign prerogative, and 
hence the general view is that external limitations on the rights of any state to exercise it 
should themselves be tightly circumscribed.126  Thus, it is a common feature of 
investment treaties to provide for a separate standard of treatment in regard to fiscal 
matters, which often means the outright exclusion of tax measures from the fair and 
equitable treatment standard.127 
 
The N-V BIT contains a separate provision (Article 4) which specifically addresses fiscal 
matters and makes no mention of FET as such, merely imposing a requirement of non-
discriminatory tax treatment, both with respect to national investors and to investors 
from other countries.128  If one analyses the COP and XOM tax claims through the lens 
of Article 4, there is no dispute that the various fiscal measures in question applied 
equally to all companies (both domestic and international) producing oil in Venezuela, 
and none among them was treated more favorably than (genuine or contrived) Dutch 
investors.  Indeed, it was the objective of the various fiscal measures to create a sole 
unified fiscal framework for all oil exploration and production activities within Venezuela.   
 
The drafting of Article 4 of the N-V BIT is not quite as clear-cut as that of other treaties 
which incorporate fiscal carve-out provisions.129  But even if it did not exclude tax 
claims, and even if the FET standard were to be interpreted broadly, the COP and XOM 
accusations of systematic and egregious violations of FET would still look far-fetched 
when measured against the other elementary yardsticks that international tribunals are 
supposed to apply in any analysis of an FET claim. 
 
It is a generally accepted proposition that ―[a] state may tax aliens without unfair 
discrimination under international law only so long as the taxation is not confiscatory‖.130  
None of the fiscal measures that the Venezuelan government took over the 2004–2007 
timeframe rendered any of the COP and XOM projects ―so marginal and unprofitable as 
effectively to deprive them of their character as investments‖.131  Far from it.  The 
behavior of oil prices over this period meant that, despite all of these measures, the 
projects generated very robust returns for their shareholders.  These returns were 
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considerably in excess of anything that COP and XOM management had anticipated 
when the investments were undertaken, as becomes evident upon the most cursory 
perusal of the financing documents for the projects.   
 
In the case of Cerro Negro, for example, the base case cash flow forecast assumed that 
the price of the upgraded crude from the project would increase ―from US$10.76 in 2001 
to US$15.97 in 2017, based on Maya crude prices increasing from US$11.88 to 
US$17.63 over the same time period‖.132  In actual fact, by 2007, Cerro Negro upgraded 
crude was fetching an average of 53.04 USD/B in the market!133  The overall profitability 
of oil industry operations in Venezuela increased very significantly given this favourable 
price environment, but nowhere more so than in the Orinoco Oil Belt.  As a high 
Chevron official (Ali Moshiri, again) explained to Ambassador Duddy: ―Chevron's margin 
per barrel in Venezuela before the recent changes in fiscal policies and equity 
structures was USD 24.  Even after the changes, Chevron's margin was still USD 13 
per barrel, over twice the margin of its operations in Argentina … [T]he high 
margins in Venezuela stem from the fact that it is not necessary to explore for crude in 
the Faja [i.e. the Orinoco Oil Belt]‖.134  And a former senior officer in the PDVSA finance 
department, who left the company on account of the 2002 work stoppage (and was 
certainly no admirer of the Chávez government), explained to other embassy officials 
that  
 
[d]espite the tax increases … the strategic associations still offer[ed] a sufficiently 
lucrative rate of return for the IOCs‖, further pointing out that ―a sensitivity analysis on 
Cerro Negro and Sincor to review the change in internal rates of return (IRR) as a 
result of tax and royalty increases … [indicated that] oil prices would have to drop 
below USD 35 per barrel for the companies to earn less than a 15 percent IRR, even 
with 30 percent royalty and 50 percent income rates.135   
 
Such a drop has yet to materialize. 
 
In the absence of the fiscal measures taken by the Chávez government, the post-2004 
profitability of the various COP and XOM association projects obviously would have 
been even greater.  However, as the Link-Trading v. Moldova tribunal explained, the 
fact that investors might forego some profit on account of changes in the tax 
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environment is not in itself ―enough to constitute expropriation.  Otherwise, the concept 
would be unlimited, since most tax measures have a cost impact on taxpayers‖.136  And 
if that can be said to be a truism for taxation in general, it is if anything even more so for 
taxes targeting profits derived exclusively from an exogenous price shock in the market 
for an internationally traded commodity, like oil.  As Sornarajah pertinently observes: 
―[t]he taxing of windfall profits (i.e. profits which arise without any act on the part of 
the investor) cannot amount to a taking. Thus, taxation of the oil industry for windfall 
profits due to price hikes cannot amount to a taking‖.137 
 
A good indication of the special place accorded to tax measures is the conduct of 
governments generally.  Raising taxes during a period of extraordinarily high prices is 
hardly unusual, whether in Venezuela or elsewhere.  Up until late 2004, when the 
statutory royalty rate for the Orinoco upgrading projects was reinstated, these projects 
were generating the lowest fiscal take in the history of foreign involvement in 
Venezuelan oil.138  Even more tellingly, the Venezuelan fiscal measures and migration 
were but a local manifestation of a wider global trend which saw the governments of 
many oil-producing jurisdictions adjusting their respective tax and institutional 
frameworks in the face of the radically changed oil price environment (the list of such 
countries includes but is not limited to Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Denmark, Ecuador, 
Israel, Kazakhstan, Russia, the United Kingdom, as well as several provinces of 
Canada). 
 
The rationale behind the actions on the fiscal front undertaken by these very disparate 
governments was articulated most eloquently in the words that the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, George Osborne, used to explain to a parliamentary committee his decision 
to raise the Supplementary Charge rate applicable to upstream income from 20 per cent 
to 30 per cent in 2011: 
 
I think it is perfectly legitimate for us to look at the price of oil at the moment … to say 
that the industry is making profits which they were not forecasting to make … [so] it is 
perfectly reasonable to look to the oil and gas industry for additional taxation … 
Given the high price of oil … it is still very profitable to invest and exploit these 
resources.  The profits on a barrel of oil are going to be higher in the next five years 
 
 
44 
 
than they were in the last five years … The companies were making £12.02 profit on 
a barrel of oil for the last five years. They are forecast to make £12.31 on the next 
five years on that barrel of oil, with the new tax. At the moment they are making 
£13.28 … So their profits are going up even with the additional tax. 
 
As a summing up of the economic factors which prompted the Venezuelan government 
to seek a rebalancing of the distribution of risk and reward between itself (qua natural 
resource owner) and oil companies, these lines can hardly be bettered.  But sight 
should not be lost of the fact that, compared to the British government, the Venezuelan 
government would have been more alive to the implications of the structural change in 
the world oil market, for the simple reason that whereas the economic wellbeing of 
Great Britain is not entirely a function of upstream oil and gas tax revenues, that of 
Venezuela most certainly is. 
 
Incidentally, during the same appearance before the Treasury Committee, Mr. Osborne 
neatly disposed of the curious notion that sovereigns are supposed to ascertain what 
parties to be affected by tax measures think about these, lest governmental action on 
the fiscal front be branded as arbitrary: ―I don‘t think it is possible to actively consult a 
business sector on a tax rise ... I think that would have been very, very difficult to 
undertake and the previous Government ... also took a similar view and didn‘t consult 
on its very similar increase in the supplementary charge. . . . [A]nd I thought it was a 
reasonable thing to ask of the oil companies, given the very high price of oil‖.139  
Interestingly, Mr. Osborne‘s sentiments in this regard were very similar in overall thrust 
to those of President Chávez but the former kept inflammatory rhetorical flourishes to a 
minimum. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, arguments continue to be made that the tax measures 
violate FET, stoked by the notion of legitimate expectations, which as Westcott remarks, 
is of fairly recent vintage: ―state action affecting an investor's basic expectations was 
first considered part of the fair and equitable treatment lexicon around six years ago [i.e. 
circa 2000]. Its prominence in Tribunal Awards, particularly since 2004, makes it 
currently the most important aspect of the fair and equitable treatment standard‖.140  
This prominence, in turn, can be attributed to the manner in which certain tribunals, 
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while outwardly paying lip service to the idea that ―the FET obligation cannot serve the 
same purpose as stabilisation clauses specifically granted to foreign investors‖141, have 
nonetheless attempted to square this particular circle by finding – very controversially – 
that in circumstances when treaties seem to ―tie the [FET] clause to the fundamental 
goal of legal stability‖,142 then any change to the legislation and fiscal and institutional 
frameworks in place when the investor undertook the investment may constitute a 
breach of the FET standard, if the effect of such state action was to frustrate the 
legitimate expectations of the investors.143 
 
International investors were quick to grasp the implications of this new status. They 
were eager to exploit the ―increased willingness of tribunals to interpret fair and 
equitable treatment as an assurance that States will not act in a manner that goes 
against the investor's legitimate expectations‖ Most of all they welcomed the way this 
could become a bridgehead through which ―to import additional obligations into the 
standard which are not necessarily required by an objective assessment of what is fair 
and equitable in a particular circumstance‖.144  This, in turn, explains why ―allegations of 
breaches of the fair and equitable treatment standard based on a departure from the 
investor's legitimate expectations are increasingly popular with claimants‖.145 
 
Despite the spirited efforts of international investors and their legal counsel, however, 
today there is still broad consensus among authorities that, in the words of the Total v. 
Argentina arbitration tribunal, ―signatories of BITs do not thereby relinquish their 
regulatory powers nor limit their prerogative to amend legislation in order to adapt it to 
change, new emerging needs and requests of their people in the normal exercise of 
their prerogatives and duties‖.146  Among other things, this means that arbitrators are 
loath to accept the proposition that, in and of themselves, the texts of laws and 
regulations constitute prima facie evidence of promises and inducements underpinning 
the legitimate expectations of investors.  As the Total v. Argentina tribunal put it, 
―legislative provisions, regulations of a unilateral normative or administrative nature, not 
so specifically addressed, cannot be construed as specific commitments that would be 
shielded from subsequent changes to the applicable law‖.147   
 
 
46 
 
For the cases at hand, this means that, on their own, neither the 1993 placement of the 
upgrading projects in the non-petroleum section of the Income Tax Law, nor the May 
1998 royalty reduction agreement, constitute in themselves ―memorialisations‖ that 
could have engendered any legitimate expectations on the part of COP and XOM that 
the Venezuelan government would refrain from either moving the projects back to the 
petroleum section of the Income Tax Law, or re-instating the statutory royalty rate, 
respectively.  In the apt phrasing of the Total v. Argentina tribunal, aside from ―the legal 
regime in force in the host country at the time of fact that the host country entered into a 
[BIT] with the country of the foreign investor,‖ there has to be ―[a] specific provision in 
the [BIT] itself or some ‗promise‘ of the host State‖, if an expectation premised on the 
stability of such legal regime is to be rendered legitimate.148 
 
This point can be even better illustrated through reference to a somewhat analogous tax 
situation at issue in the Link-Trading v. Moldova arbitration.  In that case, the tribunal 
rejected a purported ―entitlement to protection from changes in taxes and customs 
duties‖, explaining that ―there were no reasonable grounds for assuming that this partial 
exemption would not be subject to legislative review and possible modification each 
year in the context of the annual budget‖, given that the Law on the State Budget (which 
the tribunal identified as the ―legislative basis‖ of the exemptions) specified that the 
amount and limits of any customs and VAT exemptions would be set every year.149  The 
legislative basis of the preferential income tax treatment for the Orinoco upgrading 
projects was the Income Tax Law, which since its inception in 1943 has been subject to 
being amended by the Venezuelan legislative power from time to time and without 
notice, in a unilateral exercise of its sovereign faculties.  As far as the royalty reduction 
is concerned, its legislative basis was the 1943 Hydrocarbons Law, which conferred on 
the Venezuelan executive the faculty to lower the applicable rate under certain 
circumstances, but also allowed the Executive to reinstate the statutory rate at its sole 
discretion, in the face of a change in such circumstances. 
 
Another area where both FET hawks and doves profess to be in basic agreement is that 
legitimate expectations ―may not be established unilaterally‖ by the investor, nor can 
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they be ―solely the subjective expectations of the investor‖.150  In other words, tribunals 
are not supposed to take investors at their word, in terms of what the expectations of 
the latter allegedly were when they undertook an investment.  Hard proof is a 
requirement, and not just loose talk about inducements, promises, representations, or 
guaranties.  The following lines are a good example of such loose talk: 
  
the Venezuelan Government gave repeated assurances after 2001 that it would 
honor contracts signed during the oil opening. In particular, the Government entered 
on 16 January 2002 into a Royalty Procedures Agreement accepting that the royalty 
rate for the Cerro Negro Project would remain at the reduced rate of 1% and would 
not for the life of the Cerro Negro Project exceed 16 2/3% (instead of the 30% 
provided for in the 2001 Law).151 
 
The document referred to above is merely an instruction guide for the calculation of 
royalties and, needless to say, makes no mention whatsoever of any acceptance on the 
part of the government regarding the duration of the royalty holiday.  And as far as the 
purported repeated assurances that the members of the government supposedly gave, 
these would ideally have had to be memorialised in an official document in order to be 
of assistance to the claimants because, as Newcombe and Paradell stress, ―to create 
legitimate expectations, state conduct needs to be specific and unambiguous.  
Encouraging remarks from government officials do not of themselves give rise to 
legitimate expectations. There must be an ‗unambiguous affirmation‘ or a ‗definitive, 
unambiguous and repeated‘ assurance‖.152 
 
Here, again, it is interesting to refer to a cable from the petroleum attaché in the US 
embassy in Caracas reporting that he had been told by an ―ExxonMobil executive … on 
May 17 [2006] that his firm did not believe it had a legal basis for opposing the tax 
increases‖ resulting from ―amendments to the Organic Hydrocarbons Law (OHL) that 
raise income taxes on the strategic associations from 34 to 50 percent and introduced a 
33.3 percent extraction tax‖.153  Reporting this conversation to his superiors in 
Washington D.C., Ambassador William Brownfield somewhat disconsolately concluded 
as follows: ―it appears that the six international oil companies (IOCs) that are partners in 
the strategic associations have very little in the way of legal remedies to combat the tax 
increases‖.154 
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Apart from the above, legitimate expectations ―must be examined as the expectations at 
the time the investment is made‖.155  From this, it follows not only that ―[t]he duties of the 
host State must be examined in the light of the legal and business framework as 
represented to the investor at the time that it decide[d] to invest‖, but also that 
―arbitrators have no mandate to evaluate laws and regulations that predate the decision 
of a foreigner to invest‖.156 
 
What does this mean, in the context of the COP and XOM ICSID cases?  As noted 
before, these legal proceedings were initiated by Dutch corporations, invoking the 
protection of the N-V BIT.  But these Dutch avatars of COP and XOM only came into the 
picture very late in the day (2005 and 2006), when they ―acquired‖ the investments by 
virtue of their being inserted into the corporate chains of ownership of the various 
projects at issue in the arbitrations.  Therefore, that is the vantage point from which to 
examine any legitimate expectations that these Dutch investors might have had (and 
allegedly seen frustrated by actions of the Venezuelan government).  It goes without 
saying that, at that point in time, no informed investor in the Venezuelan petroleum 
sector could possibly have harboured any expectations of an immutable fiscal regime 
(let alone one based on royalty and income tax rates that had already been changed), 
as XOM‘s own submissions to the ICC tribunal make abundantly clear: 
 
Mobil CN addressed a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Venezuela, the 
Minister of Energy and Petroleum of Venezuela, and the Attorney General of 
Venezuela, complaining of a June 8, 2005 notice from an official of the Ministry of 
Energy and Petroleum that the 30% royalty rate under the 2001 Hydrocarbons Law 
should be applied to production under the A[ssociation] A[greement], as well as a 
statement by the Minister of Energy and Petroleum on June 15, 2005 announcing the 
introduction of a bill to have the oil income tax rate of 50% apply to the associations 
operating in the Orinoco Oil Belt‖.157 
 
And whatever expectations COP and XOM might have entertained back in 1995 and 
1997 (and there is much of interest to be said on that crucial matter in a subsequent 
section), their Dutch offshoots could not have ―inherited‖ such expectations through an 
inter-affiliate transfer of shares.  In terms of corporate law, an inter-affiliate transfer of 
shares is the equivalent of a sale of those shares to a third party.  And had COP and 
XOM sold their respective interests in the association projects to third parties (as XOM 
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told both the US embassy in Caracas and the ICC tribunal that it would have liked to 
do)158, the buyers of such interests – which, for the sake of the argument, could be 
assumed to be genuine (rather than fly-by-night) third party Dutch investors – would not 
have been able to turn around and sue Venezuela for measures that frustrated alleged 
legitimate expectations that COP and/or XOM might have had either when they entered 
Venezuela or at any other time before the date of this hypothetical sale of their interests. 
 
Specific undertakings or promises 
 
The preceding discussion indicates that an investor does not have a ―legitimate 
expectation‖ that the host country law will be frozen in time.  This raises the question 
whether there were any clauses in the relevant agreements in the COP and XOM cases 
purporting to effect such a legal stabilization.  The concise answer to that query is: ―No‖. 
 
Had any governmental guarantees with regard to the 1 per cent royalty holiday existed, 
for example, the Cerro Negro partners would surely not have needed to tell prospective 
purchasers of the bonds used to finance the project that there could be ―no assurance 
that the final royalty rate applicable to the Project will not differ materially from that 
assumed in the Original Base Case Projections or that any such difference would not 
have a material adverse effect and the ability of the Borrowers to repay the Senior 
Project Debt‖.159  Of course, had the partners been able to reassure the bond buyers 
thus, the task of selling these bonds would have been made easier and the bonds likely 
would have fetched a higher price.  The Petrozuata Bond Offering Circular is even more 
forthright in this regard, noting that while it was true that ―[i]n 1994, the Minister of 
Energy and Mines agreed in principle in a letter to reduce the royalty rate … to 1% for 
approximately nine years … [t]he Ministry could unilaterally modify (increase or 
decrease) the royalty at any time‖.160  And as for a purported stabilisation of other 
Venezuelan laws (such as the Income Tax Law), the XOM ICC tribunal concluded in 
this regard that ―[t]here is no real dispute that the AA is governed by Venezuelan law 
and that there is no stabilisation or freezing clause that would purport to freeze 
Venezuelan law as it existed in 1997‖.161   
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In light of the above, building a viable FET case on the basis of specific undertakings by 
the Venezuelan government to COP and XOM looks very much like a forlorn hope.  
Indeed, the following passage seems to encapsulate the legal position of these two 
companies down to a T (though it refers to an altogether different dispute on mineral 
taxation, in another jurisdiction):  
 
foreign investors are acutely aware that significant modification of taxation levels 
represents a serious risk … In many instances, they will obtain the appropriate 
guarantees … in the form of, for example, stability agreements which limit or prohibit 
the possibility of tax increases … An investor, without an agreement which limits or 
prohibits the possibility of tax increases, should not be surprised to be hit with tax 
increases in subsequent years.162   
 
And if there is one investor category in particular which should not be taken aback by 
sudden adverse tax changes, then that is investors in petroleum projects, not only 
because of the large rent element in the international price of oil, but also on account of 
its considerable volatility.  Indeed, according to Click and Weiner, 
 
political risk is probably more important in this [i.e. the oil] industry than in any other 
… This is in part due to the large rent component in natural resource prices, and in 
part due to beliefs that natural resources are a country‘s national patrimony … 
Volatile prices may exacerbate political risk during booms and mitigate it during busts 
… [E]mpirical findings confirm the view that political risk depends on market 
conditions: as assets become more valuable owing to market conditions, a greater 
fraction of their value is destroyed by political risk‖.163 
 
These empirical findings were already very much in evidence in 1971, when Raymond 
Vernon published his famous ―obsolescing bargain‖ model.164  And of course, oil 
companies like XOM and COP make it a point to say that they had found themselves at 
the wrong end of such political risks during the mid- to late 1970s, when member 
countries of the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (―OPEC‖), including 
Venezuela, tightened fiscal control over their oil industries during a time of rising prices 
in a way that gave rise to "the largest non-violent transfer of wealth in human history".165  
So, are we to believe that, all of the above notwithstanding, each of COP and XOM 
nonchalantly decided to ignore ―the business risk to be faced with changes of laws 
possibly or even likely to be detrimental to its investment‖, although it is clear that each 
of these companies ―could (and with hindsight should) have sought to protect its 
legitimate expectations by introducing into the investment agreement a stabilisation 
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clause or some other provision protecting it against unexpected and unwelcome 
changes‖?166 
 
COP and XOM maintain that they indeed took prudent steps to safeguard their 
investments, supposedly by obtaining from Venezuela promises of stability against 
unexpected and unwelcome changes, especially with regards to taxation.167  None of 
the documentary evidence cited thus far supports the proposition that the Venezuelan 
state made any such promises (and the Congressional authorisations for the projects, to 
be examined in brief, fatally contradict it).  However, this does not mean that the COP 
and XOM officers who negotiated the associations with PDVSA did not diligently try to 
secure strong protections against adverse governmental action for their companies‘ 
respective investments.  As a matter of fact, these officers actually succeeded in this 
endeavour, albeit just not in the way that many assume.  And as it happens, the key to 
unraveling the ICSID cases lies precisely in understanding not only the nature and 
rationale of the protection mechanisms that COP and XOM managed to negotiate for 
their Venezuelan investments, but also the extreme reticence on the part of these 
companies to discuss these mechanisms in any meaningful way, in the context of the 
measures taken by the Venezuelan government over the 2004-2007 timeframe.   
 
The proverbial elephant in the room of the COP and XOM claims is the safeguards 
which, at a point in time when there were no Dutch companies in the picture and the 
Venezuelan Investment Law did not even exist, COP and XOM officials diligently 
bargained for in order to protect their companies‘ investments in Venezuela.  These 
safeguards assumed the form of a mechanism whereby the companies would be 
compensated by PDVSA for governmental actions which adversely affected the 
economics of their upgrading projects, but only up to a defined limit.  And it is the 
existence of these safeguards – which during the 1990s were clearly seen by both COP 
and XOM as a far superior and robust alternative to ICSID treaty arbitration – which 
explains not only why it was that the companies decided to go ahead with very large 
capital-intensive projects in Venezuela without taking the seemingly elementary 
precaution of structuring their investments through a friendly BIT jurisdiction, but also 
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why they only ―became Dutch‖ post-haste, a full thirteen years after the N-V BIT was 
signed and on the eve of their exit from Venezuela. 
 
The real guarantees against adverse governmental measures (and the no less real 
limitations to compensation) 
 
As will be recalled from the discussion on page 29 of this paper, the projects at issue in 
the COP and XOM arbitrations owed their existence to a régime d'exception defined in 
Article 5 of the Oil Nationalisation Law, which spelled out two forms under which, after 
the promulgation of this law, private capital might be allowed to participate in the 
reserved hydrocarbons activities: (i) simple service contracts not affecting "the essence 
of the reserved activities" and (ii) association agreements, permitted only "in special 
cases and if convenient for the public interest", subject to congressional approval, and 
valid only if a State company had a participation in such associations that guaranteed 
their control by the State.   
 
The apparently counterintuitive need to contemplate such participation in the context of 
a measure reserving all hydrocarbon-related activities to the State was rationalised as a 
form of insurance against the eventuality that the nationalised industry might one day 
find itself overwhelmed by technological/economic challenges arising from some new 
aspect of the development of Venezuela's hydrocarbons endowment.  Many members 
of the Venezuelan Congress found this argument unpersuasive so, to appease them, 
revisions were included in Article 5 to comply with the imperative of ―insulating such 
exceptional cases with great legal security and extreme control‖, principles these which, 
in their turn, were embodied in the stipulation that ―these association agreements will 
therefore require for their validity the approval of the [Congressional] Chambers in 
joint session, within the conditions that they set forth, once the National Executive 
has sufficiently informed them [that is, the joint Chambers of Congress] of all matters 
related to the relevant negotiation‖.168  For the avoidance of doubt, it is worth noting that 
these requirements (and associated conditions) were not mere formalities, but essential 
features of a law of public policy implementing the reservation to the State of the 
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hydrocarbons sector (i.e. the Nationalisation Law), itself the sole source of all rights 
that shareholders in the COP and XOM association projects in Venezuela might have 
had. 
 
The basic terms and conditions in the key documents governing the Association 
projects – namely, the individual Congressional authorisations and the AAs – were 
patterned after those in a number of reports which the Bi-Cameral Congressional 
Commission had prepared and submitted to the consideration of Congress (relying on 
information provided by the Venezuelan executive) on the pertinent circumstances for 
each proposed project.  The reason behind the close adherence to the precedents set 
out in such reports, in terms of both contents and language, was made abundantly clear 
in, for example, the Congressional Authorisation of the Petrozuata Association 
Agreement: ―[t]his authorisation will have to be used within the legal framework of the 
‗conditions‘ expressly enumerated in said [Bi-Cameral Commission] Report, as they 
completely guarantee the strict fulfillment of the conditions of legality, legitimacy, 
opportunity and convenience expressed in the sole clause of Article 5 [of the 
Nationalisation Law]‖.169 
 
Among the many ―expressly enumerated‖ conditions in the Bi-Cameral Commission 
Reports was one which stipulated that the AAs were to include provisions whereby, in 
the event that the Venezuelan government took actions which adversely affected the 
economics of the projects, the PDVSA affiliates participating in the projects would 
compensate their foreign partners.  This was expressed in the following terms in the 
Twentieth Condition of the Cerro Negro Congressional Authorisation: 
 
The Association Agreement shall include provisions allowing the renegotiation of 
the Agreement as necessary to compensate any Party other than LAGOVEN [the 
PDVSA affiliate which initially participated in this project], on equitable terms, for 
adverse and significant economic consequences arising from the adoption of 
decisions made by governmental authorities, or changes in legislation, that cause 
a discriminatory treatment of THE ASSOCIATION, any entity or THE PARTIES in 
their capacity as participants in THE ASSOCIATION.170 
 
Crucially, though, the compensation for which PDVSA affiliates would be liable was not 
open-ended and unlimited.  Instead, the foreign parties would be deemed not to have 
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suffered any economic damage when the price of crude oil in the international market 
exceeded a certain threshold: 
 
However, it shall not be considered that a Party has suffered an adverse and 
significant economic consequence as a result of any of said decisions or changes in 
legislation, at any time when the Party is receiving income from THE ASSOCIATION 
equal to a price of crude oil above a maximum price that shall be specified in the 
Association Agreement‖.171 
 
This maximum price was defined as follows in the offering prospectus for the bonds 
used to finance the Cerro Negro project: 
 
―Material Adverse Impact‖ will be deemed to have occurred when Mobil Sub‘s Net 
Cash Flow in any fiscal year is decreased by more than an aggregate of 5% as 
compared to what Mobil Sub‘s Net Cash Flow would have been absent the 
Discriminatory Action(s); provided that after the first period of six consecutive months 
during which the average price of Brent crude oil (FOB North Sea) is in excess 
of US$27 per barrel (in 1996 dollars) (the ―Threshold Price‖), Lagoven Sub will not 
be required to compensate Mobil Sub for any Discriminatory Action(s) with respect to 
any day on which the price of Brent crude oil (FOB North Sea) is in excess of the 
Threshold Price…172 
 
As to how exactly this Threshold Price was to be applied, the best explanation of the 
mechanism is to be found in Section 15.2(a) of the AA: 
 
Limitation on Lagoven CN‘s Obligation … [A]fter the first period of six (6) consecutive 
months during which the Price of Brent Crude Oil is in excess of the Threshold Price, 
Lagoven CN will not be required to compensate any Foreign Party for Discriminatory 
Measures with respect to any Fiscal Year in which the average Price of Brent Crude 
Oil is in excess of the Threshold Price, and such Foreign Party receives a Net Cash 
Flow, after taking into account the effect of the Discriminatory Measure, 
commensurate with a reference price for the Production produced by the Parties that 
bears at least a reasonable relationship, adjusted for quality and transportation 
differences, to the Threshold Cash Flow for such Fiscal Year. 
 
In other words, once the price of Brent crude oil had exceeded this Threshold 
Price for six consecutive months, no compensation would be payable by Lagoven 
for any subsequent year in which the price of Brent crude oil (expressed in 1996 
dollars) averaged more than 27 USD/B.  Thus, subsequent to the original triggering 
event, the foreign parties to the AA would not be able to seek redress from Lagoven for 
any excess cash flows resulting from high oil prices that the government might 
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appropriate, even if said appropriation involved actions that actually qualified as 
Discriminatory Measures under the AAs. 
 
There were some differences among the compensation provisions in the other AAs at 
issue in the ICSID arbitrations, but the overall concept was similar, including the notion 
of limitation of liability in high price scenarios.  In the case of Petrozuata, compensation 
due was to be calculated (and limited)  
 
by reference to an average price of Brent Crude Oil deflated annually to 1994 in the 
world market.  If such price of Brent Crude Oil is less than $18 per barrel, then 
compensation is at 100% of damages.  If such price of Brent Crude Oil is more 
than $25 per barrel, then compensation is at 0% of damages.  If such price of 
Brent Crude Oil is between $18 and $25 per barrel, the percentage of damages to be 
compensated shall be determined according to a specified formula.  If damages 
exceed $75 million in any year, the amount compensated will be at the greater of 
25% of the actual economic damage and the amount resulting from the Brent Crude 
Oil calculation.  All dollar amounts are adjusted for inflation.173 
 
In the case of Hamaca, the foreign parties would be owed no compensation as long as 
they received a net cash flow in excess of a Threshold Cash Flow calculated at a Brent 
crude oil price of 27 USD/B in 1996 dollars, regardless of any adverse governmental 
measure (discriminatory or otherwise).174 
 
The idea behind the compensation mechanisms at the core of all the extra-heavy crude 
oil upgrading projects was that the government would be deterred from changing the 
fiscal conditions by the knowledge that any attempt on its part to do so would cost the 
Venezuelan state oil company and its affiliates dearly.  This intent is patently obvious in 
clause 15.1(c) of the Cerro Negro AA, for example:  
 
[i]n the event that a Discriminatory Measure for which Lagoven CN is paying 
compensation to a Foreign Party, or in response to which the Agreement has been 
modified, is reversed or ceases to be in effect, the obligation of Lagoven CN to pay 
compensation, or the modification made to the Agreement, shall cease to be in effect 
to the same extent; provided that the Foreign Party has been compensated for the 
damages previously suffered as a result of such Discriminatory Measure‖.175 
 
However, so long as oil prices remained above certain levels, in a sustained fashion, 
the parties to the AAs were content not to have this Damoclean sword hanging over the 
head of the Venezuelan government.  Needless to say, this did not arise out of a  show 
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of generosity on their part, and to appreciate  the tokenistic nature of their gesture, one 
need look no further than to the contemporary research into the matter carried out by 
someone who would eventually end up by playing a key role in the migration saga. 
 
As viceminister of Hydrocarbons between 2005 and 2008, Bernard Mommer was 
credited by ―company officials … with orchestrating the GOV strategy toward them … 
point[ing] to his career as an academic in which he studied how to maximize collection 
of oil rents on the part of the state‖.176 In 1999, Mommer published the following 
passage on the compensation limitation provisions in the AAs, and their relationship 
with oil market windfalls: 
 
 
[t]he Cerro Negro Association Agreement . . . also contains a definition of what 
PDVSA and its partners could consider as an excess profit, which then could in fact 
be subject to some special tax.  It is defined therein as the Base Price of Brent Crude 
Oil … of US$27, in 1996 dollars . . . The following assumptions are defined below: (1) 
Brent Crude must be above this level, of course, adjusted for inflation, without 
interruption for more than six months; (2) Brent Crude exceeds this level, on average, 
during the entire fiscal year. Only if these two assumptions are met, the government 
may then impose some additional tax on the Association, collecting a part of that 
excess [profit] without [triggering] a payment of compensation by Lagoven. However, 
it must be noted that this price level has only been reached once during the 
140-year history of oil, between 1980 and 1984, due to the Iranian revolution 
and the subsequent war with Iraq.177 
 
 
Mommer decried these provisions because they made a hostage of PDVSA in order to 
inhibit the government from the legitimate exercise of its sovereign powers, and 
therefore represented a betrayal of the guiding principle of long-term Venezuelan oil 
policy since the 1940s.  As Mommer saw it, starting in 1943, the government had 
―claimed the legitimate right of Venezuela, as the resource owner, to all excess profits 
that might accrue in its exploitation … [but] fifty years later a state owned oil company, 
Lagoven, agreed with its foreign partners to deny this right of the nation, ie, to deny the 
very essence of nationalisation‖.178  In addition, Mommer vehemently objected to the 
fact that such freedom of action as these provisions supposedly afforded the 
government was in any case illusory, given the extreme unlikelihood that oil would ever 
exceed the Threshold Price for the requisite period of time (after all, this had only 
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happened ―once during the 140-year history of oil‖).  And this, in turn, explains the 
nonchalance with which XOM and COP declined to structure their investments in 
Venezuela through The Netherlands: the protection afforded by this compensation 
mechanism – administered by PDVSA (which also provided a parent guarantee for its 
operating affiliates) and underpinned by ICC arbitration – was seen by the companies 
as a superior alternative compared to ICSID treaty arbitration (its main advantages 
being ease of calculation, enforcement and collection, and a very favourable price 
threshold). 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is obvious that the COP and XOM vision of the likely 
behaviour of the oil market in the medium and long term was well wide of the mark.  In 
making such a mistake, COP and XOM were in good company.  It is no exaggeration to 
say that the post-2000 oil price explosion was foreseen by no one: not COP, not XOM, 
not PDVSA, not Mommer, not even Nostradamus.  But that, of course, does not mean 
that the contractual conditions that these companies bargained for – including the 
formulae for compensation on account of adverse governmental action – can or should 
be jettisoned without further ado.  In fact, these formulae should carry an enormous 
weight in terms of determining the fair market value of the Petrozuata, Hamaca and 
Cerro Negro upgrading projects on the eve of their nationalisation, as no diligent 
prospective buyer would have failed to take them into consideration when calculating a 
purchase price for the COP and XOM interests.  After all, it goes without saying that, in 
post-2000 market circumstances, any hypothetical buyer would have conferred a much 
lower value to a project with an income cap of 27 USD/B, adjusted by inflation, than to 
one without.179  Indeed, this is one of the reasons why Venezuela has always 
maintained that the compensation figures that COP and XOM bandied about were the 
stuff of fantasy.  Such a stance has nothing to do with a purported attempt on 
Venezuela‘s part to limit compensation to book value (in contravention of the relevant 
provisions of the N-V BIT), but merely reflects the well settled proposition that any 
restrictions or limitations on a contractual or property right must be taken into 
consideration when calculating the value of such right.180 
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The fortuitous publication of leaked diplomatic cables originating from the US embassy 
in Venezuela shows that COP and XOM (and the US State department, incidentally) 
were perfectly aware that there was no factual basis to their steadfast allegations that 
Venezuelan offers of compensation were based solely on book value.  But if what one is 
after is evidence of abuse of process on the part of these two companies (and 
irresponsible cheerleading on the part of their home government), then pride of place 
surely belongs to their repeated assertions that the legal disputes with Venezuela 
involve a breach of contract on the part of the government.  To quote the words of Rex 
Tillerson, XOM CEO as of the time of writing, ―[o]ur situation in Venezuela is a pure and 
simple contract.  The contract was disregarded‖.181 
 
In order to appreciate the disconnection from reality of the  statement above, it is 
necessary to put forward only one question: why was it that the AAs needed to 
incorporate compensation mechanisms in the first place?  The answer – couched in 
unambiguous terms – can be found in some of the other essential conditions that the 
Venezuelan Congress stipulated for each one of the association projects (i.e. conditions 
without which the projects could not even have come into legal existence). 
 
Consider, for example, the Sixteenth Condition of the Petrozuata Congressional 
Authorisation:  
 
The Association Agreement shall include provisions that allow Maraven to 
compensate the other parties, under equitable terms, for the significant and adverse 
economic consequences directly derived from the adoption of decisions by the 
national, state or municipal administrative authorities, or from changes in legislation 
that, due to their content and purpose, cause an unfair discriminatory treatment to the 
Company or to such other parties, always in their capacity as such and as parties to 
the Association Agreement, all without diminishing in any way the sovereign 
power to legislate, inherent in the very existence of the national, state and 
municipal legislative powers. 
 
For good measure, the Eighteenth Condition made it clear that the ―Association 
Agreement to be executed, the commercial company to be created and the activities of 
a diverse nature that will derive from such acts‖ would, in no case, ―in and of themselves 
give rise to liability on the part of the Republic of Venezuela, which could only arise in 
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the event that such liability were to be assumed through a valid express legal act of its 
authorities‖.182 
 
In the case of the Hamaca project, the Nineteenth Condition of its corresponding 
Congressional Authorisation stated, along similar lines, that ―[t]he Association 
Agreement, the creation and operation of the Entities and other activities shall not 
impose any obligation on the Republic of Venezuela nor shall they restrict its 
exercise of sovereign powers‖.183 The Twenty-first Condition in the authorisation 
complemented this by providing that, while foreign participants in the Hamaca Project 
would be entitled to receive compensation from a PDVSA affiliate – subject to the 
conditions and limitations established in the AA – in the event of certain specified 
changes in Venezuelan law or governmental actions, ―[i]n no case will it be understood 
that the application of these mechanisms limits, affects or restricts in any way the power 
of governmental organs to adopt measures pursuant to the Constitution and applicable 
Laws‖.184  The content of the Eighteenth Condition of the Cerro Negro Congressional 
Authorisation is very similar: ―[t]he Association Agreement, and all activities and 
operations conducted under it, shall not impose any obligation on the Republic of 
Venezuela nor shall they restrict its sovereign powers, the exercise of which shall 
not give rise to any claim, regardless of the nature or characteristics of the claim‖.185 
 
At this point, a further question inevitably arises: is there any way in which informed 
investors could have taken any of the passages above as an assurance of tax stability 
from the Venezuelan government that would have engendered legitimate expectations 
on their part in this regard?  It is worthwhile to let the representatives of the claimants 
themselves provide the reader with the answers. 
 
In the case of COP, in in a meeting held at embassy premises on September 5th, 2008 
(―following a September 4 meeting with the Venezuelan Government (BRV) negotiating 
team‖), the company‘s Latin America President, Roy Lyons, told US diplomatic 
personnel that:  
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the original contracts for the Petrozuata and Hamaca Strategic Associations included 
clauses stipulating that, if the fiscal terms of the contracts were changed by the 
BRV, PDVSA would cover the losses of the investor up to a certain point.  The 
maximum oil price named in the clause is much lower than current world oil 
prices which would be cited by ConocoPhillips in its claim to the ICSID panel.  The 
heart of the BRV legal strategy, according to Lyons, is its belief that ICSID's 
jurisdiction will be thrown out.  Lyons noted however, that ConocoPhillips has filed its 
claims against the Government of Venezuela and not PDVSA.  The company has 
consulted with two major international law firms which both confirmed their belief that 
there was a greater than 95 percent possibility that ConocoPhillips would prevail on 
this legal point.186 
 
The latter part of the passage shows COP speculating that the basis for the Venezuelan 
jurisdictional challenges would be the contention that the dispute over valuation 
between the parties was a contractual affair, and that the claim should be thrown out 
because the government was not a party to the AAs.187  In implied reply to this 
hypothetical challenge, COP seems to be offering the argument that what the contracts 
actually said is of no particular import in the arbitration because, after all, the company 
filed for breach of treaty against the government, as opposed to breach of contract 
against PDVSA. 
 
The degree of confidence that COP and its counsel placed on this legal position is 
remarkable in the light of the contents of another diplomatic cable where an XOM 
executive was reported to have told US embassy officials ―that his firm did not believe it 
had a legal basis for opposing the tax increases‖.  In connection with this opinion, it is 
candidly related elsewhere in the cable that the intractable problem faced by the 
companies really lay in the fact that 
 
each of the strategic association agreements has some form of indemnity clause that 
protects them from tax increases. Under the clauses, PDVSA will indemnify the 
partners if there is an increase in taxes. However, in order to receive payment, a 
certain level of economic damage must occur. In order to determine the level of 
damage, the indemnity clauses contain formulas that, unfortunately, assume low oil 
prices. Due to current high oil prices, it is highly unlikely that the increases will 
create significant enough damage under the formulas to reach the threshold 
whereby PDVSA has to pay the partners.188 
 
Indeed, this distinct unlikelihood that the actions of the Venezuelan government would 
transgress the boundaries of contractual provisions drawn by the companies 
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themselves had proved to be an abiding source of frustration to them well before their 
exit from Venezuela.  For example, as early as January 12, 2005, ExxonMobil de 
Venezuela President Mark Ward was informing the US embassy ―that the company 
ha[d] decided to move ahead with some legal action in response to the unilateral GOV 
decision to increase the royalty payments levied on the extra heavy oil projects‖, 
apparently by relying on ―wording in Venezuela's investment law that will give it an 
avenue to avoid the Venezuelan courts and get to international arbitration‖.  Embassy 
officials saw XOM‘s hardline stance as potentially fatal in terms of any future ―attempts 
to expand its business with Venezuela‖, but concluded that, in taking it, the company 
was ―presumably looking at potential risks around the world‖.189  In the event, and 
despite XOM‘s avowed concern at such world-wide ramifications, the company declined 
to embark on litigation over the royalty reinstatement, in all probability out of an 
appreciation that the contents of the AA would have doomed such an enterprise to 
failure.190   
 
What is more, despite a provision in the AA stating that ―in the event that one of the 
Foreign Parties determines that a Discriminatory Measure has occurred which may 
result in a Materially Adverse Impact, such a Foreign Party shall immediately provide 
notice of the Discriminatory Measure to Lagoven CN‖, XOM did not even  hand formal 
notice to PDVSA about its objection to the royalty measure (or, indeed, to any of the 
subsequent fiscal measures).191  XOM would only do so – by means of an omnibus 
rejection of all the fiscal measures taken by Venezuela from October 2004 onwards – 
on June 22, 2007, on the eve of its exit from the country.  Shortly thereafter, presumably 
lest anybody misinterpret this rather belated notice as being somehow not in line with 
the idea that XOM "takes sanctity of contract very seriously"192, the company initiated an 
ICC arbitration, alleging breach of contract against PDVSA on account of, inter alia, 
―failing to indicate its concurrence, pursuant to Section 15.1(b) of the AA, that 
Discriminatory Measures causing a Materially Adverse Impact had occurred‖!193 
 
Earlier in this paper we asked whether it was possible to find a government guarantee in 
the suite of agreements which constituted the legal foundations of the COP and XOM 
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association projects.  Our analysis of these agreements shows that, far from containing 
any specific undertakings or promises from Venezuela to either COP or XOM, the AAs 
stipulated that they imposed no obligations on the Republic, which was not even a party 
to these agreements.  Furthermore, the Congressional authorisations for these projects 
expressly reserved the exercise of the Republic‘s sovereign rights, in no uncertain 
terms.  Nevertheless, according to XOM‘s submissions to the ICC tribunal, the purpose 
of the compensation limitation provisions apparently was not to counterbalance the 
proviso that the AA would not ―impose any obligation on the Republic of Venezuela nor 
... restrict its sovereign powers, the exercise of which shall not give rise to any claim‖.  
Rather, these provisions supposedly reflected the fact that ―the Parties knew that 
pursuing a claim against the Government would be difficult and lengthy and ... they, 
therefore, crafted the indemnity provisions such that they would function regardless of 
any claim that the Claimant may have against the Republic of Venezuela‖.194  In other 
words, as XOM reads the clauses in the Cerro Negro AA quoted above, Venezuela‘s 
exercise of its sovereign powers could nevertheless give rise to claims against the 
Republic (over and above any PDVSA liabilities pursuant to the indemnity provisions), 
and this is supposedly confirmed by the fact that Article 15.1(a) of the AA ―contemplates 
an action against the Republic of Venezuela that would be conducted independently, 
but in parallel, with [ICC] arbitration against PDVSA-CN‖.195 
 
It does not seem unfair to suggest that such fanciful hermeneutics would probably get 
short shrift in a court, were XOM not the company behind them and, perhaps even more 
importantly, were they not being aimed at Venezuela.  Be that as it may, for the 
purposes of this exposition, XOM‘s arguments are useful because they provide an 
opening to bring the discussion round to the topic of the ICC arbitrations.  As mentioned 
before, these particular ICC proceedings happen to be very different from run-of-the-mill 
arbitrations, not least because they do not arise from commercial disagreements 
between business partners but, rather, revolve around actions taken by a government 
which was not a party to the contracts at issue, in exercise of basic sovereign 
prerogatives, whether it be the regulation of production of a natural resource whose 
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property is vested in the nation (as in the COP ICC case) or the taxation of the proceeds 
obtained from the exploitation of that natural resource (as in the XOM ICC case). 
  
The ICC cases: COP 
 
The COP ICC case is somewhat of an outlier in the context of the disputes in 
international courts of arbitration pitting COP and XOM, on one side, and PDVSA and 
Venezuela, on the other.  This is a function both of its comparatively modest magnitude 
(COP‘s claim amounted to ―only‖ 165 MMUSD), as much as of its somewhat peculiar 
timing (the request for arbitration was only filed on December 30, 2009, more than two 
and a half years after the conclusion of the events underlying the claim).196  Also, COP‘s 
ICC claim did not seem to be obviously duplicative of a claim before ICSID.  The overall 
impression of marginality is reinforced because, in sharp contrast to what happened in 
the XOM ICC case, the publication of the award was greeted with indifference by COP, 
PDVSA, Venezuela, and the oil market and industry at large. 
 
The COP ICC case revolved around the production curtailments that the Venezuelan 
government imposed on the Petrozuata and Hamaca projects between November 2006 
and May 2007, in order to comply with OPEC quota commitments.  According to COP, 
such cutbacks breached assurances that PDVSA affiliates had given COP affiliates, and 
which were embodied in two different legal instruments.  In the case of Hamaca, it was 
section 13.1 of the AA itself which, according to the COP affiliate, obliged the PDVSA 
affiliate participating in the project to ―(i) ensure that the curtailments were established in 
a proportionate manner and (ii) mitigate the effects produced by the OPEC 
curtailments‖.197  In the case of Petrozuata, it was a confidential side letter to the AA, 
signed on the same day as the latter by the chief executives of Maraven and Conoco, 
respectively.198  Under the terms of this side letter, Maraven (and/or any successor in 
interest) assumed ―the obligation ... to absorb any impact that OPEC curtailments may 
have had on the Petrozuata Project out of its own production‖.199  Crucially, this letter 
―was never shown to the [Venezuelan] Congress, neither in form, concept or content, 
and none of the contractual arrangements shown to Congress ever mentioned - either 
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directly or through reference to further agreements – the obligation set out in the 
Petrozuata Side Letter‖, even though ―[t]he Conditions approved by Congress ... [were] 
of an exhaustive nature ('taxativas') and ... [could not] cover issues which were not duly 
disclosed to Congress‖.200 
 
The COP ICC tribunal rejected all claims related to the Hamaca project, and concluded 
that the sole basis of PDVSA liability was indeed ―any damage or loss resulting from 
Maraven's failure to comply with its obligations under the Petrozuata Side Letter, in 
particular the obligation to absorb the relevant production curtailments‖.201  The resulting 
award came to around 65 MMUSD. 
 
Notwithstanding its relative insignificance, the COP ICC case is revealing from the 
standpoint of the Venezuelan political process during the decade of the 1990s.  In the 
first place, the side letter episode provides an insight as to the inordinate lengths to 
which PDVSA managers were ready to go in order to further the agenda of oil 
liberalisation in Venezuela during those years, even when this meant overstepping very 
clear statutory boundaries.  The ultimate example of this, of course, was the leading role 
that PDVSA upper management played in promoting not one but two separate attempts 
to unseat the constitutional government of the country (a military putsch in April 2002, 
and a three-month strike that paralysed the oil industry and much of Venezuela‘s 
economic activity, starting in November of that same year), events which would 
culminate in the separation of thousands of white collar workers from the company. 
 
On a symbolic plane, this arbitration is as much a consequence as a reflection of a long-
term project cherished by those PDVSA managers who devised and implemented the 
AA projects; namely, to subvert the whole OPEC quota system, and even to call into 
question the very right of the Venezuelan government to regulate the output of a 
valuable, non-renewable and depleting natural resource like oil.  Their ambition in this 
regard crystallised in the text of the Thirteenth Condition of the Hamaca Congressional 
authorisation, which established that ―[i]n the event that the Association is required to 
reduce its production as a result of international commitments of the Republic of 
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Venezuela, such reduction shall not exceed the percentage reduction generally 
applicable to the Venezuelan oil industry as a whole ... calculated on the basis of 
available production capacity‖.202  What is striking about this passage is not so much the 
requirement for proportionality, but the extraordinary idea that decisions of the 
Venezuelan government regarding possible curbs on oil production would only be valid 
if undertaken in the context of some sort of international agreement (whether this be 
OPEC, or else the sort of arrangement that many governments would like to see as 
OPEC‘s successor: a commodity agreement involving both producers and consumers, 
and for which the International Energy Forum is likely to be  laying the foundations).  
Again, such a notion ran completely counter to the direction of Venezuelan oil 
conservation policy since the Second World War, which was predicated on the State‘s 
absolute right to regulate the exploitation of the natural resources belonging to the 
Nation, irrespective of whether the State carried out these functions on its own or in 
concert with other like-minded sovereigns.  And it is remarkable that this radical policy 
about-face should have been adopted thanks to the good offices of PDVSA, an entity 
that was meant to be the key vehicle for Venezuela‘s assertion of its sovereign control 
over its petroleum resources, ostensibly for the greater welfare of its population.  The 
Thirteenth Condition of the Hamaca AA was likely only the thin end of what promised to 
be a much wider and formidable wedge, aimed at rending OPEC asunder through the 
effective withdrawal of Venezuela from the organisation. 
 
The ICC cases: XOM 
 
The AAs for the upgrading projects in the Orinoco Oil Belt were representative 
examples of a type of petroleum exploration and production agreement that became 
quite widespread during the 1980s and 1990s.  The most distinctive feature of these 
agreements was that "instead of targeting the legislative power of the state founded on 
sovereignty", they sought to "set up a contractual mechanism of allocating the financial 
effect of political risk to the state enterprise", thereby displacing the centre of gravity of 
the resource owner/investor relationship from "a sovereign and state-related promise to 
a mechanism of commercial contracting with regard for the implications of damages for 
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breach of obligation – a move from a predominantly public law perspective to one based 
primarily on commercial contract law".203  In such a manner, once a national oil 
company (―NOC‖) like PDVSA became a party to an agreement whereby its home state 
was to receive minimal fiscal benefits from the exploitation of the hydrocarbon 
resources under its jurisdiction, the resulting asymmetrical division of the spoils would 
be safeguarded thereafter by the prospect of the NOC having to cough up large sums of 
money in the event that the government in question changed its mind about such 
arrangements. 
 
The protection mechanisms embedded in the AAs, underpinned by ICC arbitration, 
proved to be as ill-suited for the post-2000 conditions in the oil market as the Maginot 
Line was for defending France against mechanised armoured columns, and for a similar 
reason, namely, that they were both conceived to deal with very specific contingencies 
that stubbornly failed to materialise.  The AAs were prime examples of the sort of 
contract that was meant to become de rigeur in a market environment characterised by 
resource abundance, untrammeled output and a fiscal race to the bottom among natural 
resource owners, as in a scenario imagined by Michael Klein of Royal Dutch/Shell: 
 
[w]ith declining real oil prices the fight over upstream rents continues to intensify. 
Many oil-exporting countries are crucially depend on oil revenues ... As population 
grows and the price of oil declines, producer countries open up all parts of the oil and 
gas business for foreign investors. They revise tax regimes to attract investors.  In 
particular, countries with marginal fields abolish royalties ... [B]y 2040 ... tax systems 
for upstream operations converge to regular corporate tax regimes as upstream rents 
diminish.204 
 
Ironically, as these lines were being published in 1999, the oil price was already on the 
rebound from its catastrophic 1998 cycle lows, and being vertiginously propelled, by a 
feeble supply response in the face of runaway demand emanating primarily from China, 
along an upward path that would take it to historical highs in 2008.  This price behaviour 
reflected the fact that Klein‘s oil cornucopia turned out to be illusory, as comes across 
clearly in Thane Gustafson‘s pithy appraisal of global oil prospects at the beginning of 
the 21st Century: ―[i]n 1980, over 360 billion barrels of discovered oil lay undeveloped 
worldwide, two-thirds of it not even covered by a development plan.  Now, in the new 
century, nearly 90 per cent of all discovered oil resources are under development, and 
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much of what remains undeveloped consists of difficult or inferior prospects‖.205  Thus, 
the defeat, by the market itself, of the premises underlying the agenda of radical oil 
liberalisation, did indeed lead to a wholesale revision of tax regimes all over the globe, 
but in the exact opposite direction to that foreseen by Klein.  This process of revision got 
underway in earnest in 2003 with an event as unheralded as it is momentous: the 
―migration‖ of the DUC oil and gas concession in Denmark (treated in more detail in the 
conclusions to this paper). 
 
High oil prices may have swamped the AA protection mechanisms in terms of their 
reason for being (i.e. deterring the government from adjusting the fiscal regime for the 
project) but, from the very outset, ICC arbitration was nevertheless a central plank of the 
legal strategy that XOM decided to pursue against Venezuela.  This is because ICC 
proceedings offered XOM the means ―to obtain a worldwide freezing order and 
attachments not available in the context of the ICSID proceeding‖ (because such 
actions are not allowed under the ICSID Convention), and also ―to build an argument 
under the Chalmette Offtake Agreement supporting a future seizure of the 50% interest 
of a PDVSA subsidiary in the Chalmette refinery in Louisiana‖.206 
 
In the ICC claim, XOM alleged breach of the covenant (guaranteed by PDVSA) whereby 
PDVSA-CN had undertaken to provide an indemnity to Mobil Cerro Negro in the event 
of certain adverse governmental measures (i.e. under the limitation of liability clauses 
that are supposedly irrelevant in the ICSID cases). XOM claimed the breach arose from 
the fact that neither PDVSA CN nor PDVSA paid the damages that XOM had 
unilaterally determined it was owed.  The measures that XOM alleged entitled it to an 
indemnity were as follows:  
 
(a) direct expropriation of Mobil CN‘s interests in the Cerro Negro joint venture 
without compensation and (b) measures preceding such direct appropriation, 
including (i) repudiation of Royalty Reduction Agreement and imposition of the so-
called extraction tax; (ii) refusal to allow the expansion of the Cerro Negro project 
under previously agreed terms and conditions; (iii) income-tax increases that were 
levied solely on participants in Orinoco Oil Belt ventures, which were inconsistent 
with the Framework of Conditions; and (iv) imposition of production and export 
curtailments to the Cerro Negro Joint Venture.207 
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The XOM ICC claim, then, overlapped with the ICSID case, with both cases presumably 
meant to dovetail into one another so that, if XOM were to fail to get a satisfactory result 
in the speedier ICC process, it would still have ICSID to fall back on.208 The ICC tribunal 
found that while there had been no breach of contract on the part of PDVSA, some of 
the governmental acts referred to above – specifically, the nationalisation itself and the 
change in income tax rate – were compensable events (i.e. ―Discriminatory Measures‖ 
under the AA definition) for which PDVSA was liable under the indemnity provisions of 
the AAs.209 
 
As mentioned before, the tribunal awarded XOM a total of 907.58 MMUSD (less 
counterclaims of 160.64 MMUSD), after applying the agreed contractual formulae on 
limits to compensation.  XOM has sought to portray this award as representing 
―recovery on a limited, contractual liability of PDVSA that was provided for in the Cerro 
Negro project agreement‖, a determination that supposedly has no bearing on the 
―larger‖ proceeding before ICSID.210  However,  this interpretation of the outcome of the 
ICC arbitration is very much at odds with other key provisions in the Cerro Negro AA.  
According to XOM, ―the ICSID arbitration fulfills [sic.] Article 15.1(a) AA which requires 
the Claimant to pursue legal actions to mitigate damages suffered as a result of a 
Discriminatory Measure‖.211  However, that same article also requires XOM to credit any 
and all net proceeds from any award obtained pursuant to such legal actions against 
damages payable calculated under the Cerro Negro formulae or, in the event of such 
damages having already been paid, to reimburse such proceeds in full to PDVSA Cerro 
Negro (successor to Lagoven‘s  interest in the project).212  That being the case, and with 
it having been adjudicated that the 2007 nationalisation of XOM‘s interest in Cerro 
Negro constituted a Discriminatory Measure and, furthermore, with the ―Damages 
payable‖ having been calculated in accordance with the compensation formulae, the 
question arises as to whether the XOM ICC tribunal has effectively rendered XOM‘s 
ICSID claims moot (insofar as they relate to the Cerro Negro project).213 
 
The XOM ICC decision is also of great significance as far as the COP ICSID arbitration 
is concerned, in terms of the determination of the discount rate to be applied to future 
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cash flows in the calculation of the fair market value of nationalised assets.  XOM‘s 
submissions before both the English courts and the ICC tribunal highlight how the 
manipulation of discount rates, if unchecked, will lead to distortions in compensation.  In 
the High Court in London, for instance, XOM arrived at a damages figure of USD 12 
billion for its claim by  calculating the cash flows for 27.5 years and then adding them 
up, without discounting the sum to present value terms (in other words, XOM relied 
upon a discount rate of zero, ostensibly because the Association Agreement formulae 
made no provision for discounting).214  In the ICC case, XOM retreated from this  
position, but the company still argued for an extraordinarily low discount rate of 3.37 per 
cent (i.e., less than a U.S. Treasury bond at the time).  In other words, XOM argued that 
the indemnity cash flows from PDVSA had the same risk profile, or were as safe as, a 
U.S. Treasury bond.   
 
The ICC tribunal did not buy XOM‘s approach to discounting.  Instead of a discount rate 
of 3.37 per cent, the ICC tribunal selected a rate of 18 percent, a figure which ―while 
lower than the rates provided in the Phillips [v. Iran] decision and the Himpurna 
[California Energy Ltd. v. Republic of Indonesia] case, appropriately reflect[ed] the risks 
related to the indemnity cash flow analysis in the ... case [of Mobil Cerro Negro]‖.  As 
well as categorically stating that ―[t]he ‘risk free’ rate proposed by the Claimant is 
not acceptable‖215, the tribunal made it clear that, had it been tasked with quantifying 
cash flows not subject to a protection mechanism, the discount rate it would have used 
would have been higher still: ―[t]he Tribunal considers that there is a difference between 
valuing future cash flows under an indemnity formula and valuing the potential cash 
flows from a project.  There is a valid distinction between the two exercises, not the 
least of which being that there may be fewer risks to indemnity cash flows than to 
Project cash flows‖.216 
 
Some reputedly well-informed observers of the arbitration scene were taken aback by 
the stance on discount rates on the part of the XOM ICC tribunal.217  This is puzzling, 
given that the overall approach that the tribunal followed was in accordance with 
previous guidance from other arbitral tribunals as pertains the issue of country risk218, 
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not to mention the specific procedures by which supra-national institutions go about 
quantifying the risks posed by international mineral exploitation projects, in general, and 
oil exploration and production projects, in particular.219  Furthermore, the figure that the 
ICC tribunal arrived at is broadly consistent with the evidence of the internal hurdle rates 
that oil companies rely upon in order to weigh their investment and acquisition options.  
Ascertaining what these rates might be in the cases of individual companies has always 
been a notoriously tricky affair, because company officers studiously avoid going into 
specifics whenever this topic crops up in public discussions.  That is why one should be 
particularly appreciative of the forthright manner in which Sergey Bogdanichov (former 
CEO of Rosneft) discussed the sort of discount factor that his company would factor in a 
bid for interests in projects located in high-risk countries (like Venezuela): ―[w]e have a 
strict rule not to buy assets with an internal rate of return of less than 20%.  There aren‘t 
many overseas plays that meet that requirement ... We have no intention of buying 
assets that would lower those metrics.  We don‘t need deals that bring nothing except 
press items‖.220 
 
Mr. Bogdanichov's threshold level is very much in line with the minimum returns that the 
government of the United Kingdom believes international oil companies expect to obtain 
from oil and gas exploration and production activities in that country, as witnessed by 
the workings of the fiscal regime applicable to such activities.  The centrepiece of this 
fiscal regime is the so-called Petroleum Revenue Tax (PRT), a special levy on oil and 
gas production which seeks to tax windfall profits on a field by field basis at a relatively 
high rate (currently 50 per cent).  PRT incorporates a series of special reliefs and 
mechanisms meant to ensure that projects which generate no windfall profits are 
protected from the tax.  Among these mechanisms is one known as the "Safeguard", 
designed "to give companies a degree of assurance about the minimum level of 
profits they can expect to enjoy after PRT (but before CT), with a view to ensuring 
that marginal fields remain profitable".221  The Safeguard restricts "the amount of PRT 
payable by a participator in a chargeable period if the effect of the PRT would be to 
reduce after-tax profit below a minimum return on investment in the field".222  That 
minimum return is defined as "15 per cent of the participator's 'accumulated capital 
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expenditure' in the field up to the end of the chargeable period in question", with 
'accumulated capital expenditure' in turn defined as "the cumulative amount of field 
expenditure allowed as qualifying for supplement".223  Of course, if 15 per cent is the 
minimum return that oil and gas projects have to attract in a highly developed 
jurisdiction such as the UK (a country with deep and liquid markets for oil, financial 
services, labour, construction services and so on), the returns that investors will 
demand to take their capital to (say) Venezuela, will have to be significantly higher, if for 
no other reason than to reflect country risk.  The rules for the application of PRT also 
stipulate that "where an interest in a field changes hands, the new owner inherits the 
position of the old owner, including any unused expenditure relief and allowable losses, 
and also the 'cumulative capital expenditure' for safeguard".224  With this provision, the 
UK government is doing nothing more than recognising the common-sense position that 
investors expect to meet or exceed their hurdle rate in any venture, whether this 
involves undertaking a start-up project or else buying into an extant project (as in the 
case of a hypothetical sale of XOM‘s interests in Venezuela). 
 
The unsoundness of XOM‘s approach to the issue of the applicable discount rate for the 
purpose of valuing a nationalised interest is perhaps best laid bare in the 
aforementioned Himpurna decision (rendered by a tribunal whose president was Prof. 
Jan Paulsson, joint lead counsel in the COP ICSID arbitration against Venezuela): 
The fact remains that it is riskier to enter into a 30-year venture in Indonesia than in 
more mature economies. And it is no answer to say that the contract has allocated 
99% of the risk to the Indonesian side. After all, there are documents which by their 
terms allot 100% of the risk to the debtor: bonds. Although they may be denominated 
in US dollars, although they may stipulate absolute obligations to pay, it still makes a 
difference whether the issuer is Switzerland or Swaziland ... This is the fundamental 
issue of country risk, obvious to the least sophisticated businessman.225 
 
There is no reason to believe that either COP or XOM have any great problem in 
recognising such a fundamental issue, of course.  But companies such as these seem 
to have considerable difficulties in recognising that they themselves are bound by the 
rules that they insist apply to everybody else.  And, ironically, their tacit pretension to be 
somehow above such rules comes across most obviously when one analyses their own 
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conduct through the prism of the principle that supposedly triggered their disputes with 
Venezuela: sanctity of contract. 
 
What contracts are COP and XOM talking about, exactly? 
 
During a visit to Venezuela at the beginning of 2005, US Senator Norm Coleman (R-
Minn.) asked Mark Ward, president of ExxonMobil de Venezuela, whether it was a good 
idea to dispute the reinstatement of the 16 2/3 per cent royalty rate for the Association 
projects, especially when ―other international oil companies affected by the GOV 
decision had decided not to protest‖.  Ward‘s response was that ―ExxonMobil perhaps 
had a ‗different perspective‘ on contract sanctity than other companies. For ExxonMobil, 
he said, the sanctity of contracts is paramount … Unilateral contract changes without 
compensation, he said, are very troubling‖.226  However, it appears that the XOM 
perspective on pacta sunt servanda – one that COP clearly shares – is that the pacta 
whose inviolability has to be defended tooth and nail extends to bargains which these 
companies wish they had struck, as opposed to those contracts and provisions which 
they actually negotiated and signed (and may have come to regret). 
The picture of the fiscal measures and subsequent migration that emerges from a 
review of the voluminous paper trail of documents produced in fulfillment of the exacting 
regulatory procedures contemplated in Article 5 of the Nationalisation Law, is at 
significant variance with the COP and XOM account of such measures.227  As these 
companies would have it, the Venezuelan government and PDVSA treated the AAs ―as 
the proverbial ‗scrap[s] of paper‘ that they can disregard at their convenience‖, in the 
process ―breaking all the commitments they made to induce that investment‖.228  In fact, 
the documentary record shows that all Orinoco projects were authorised by the 
Venezuelan Congress subject to the express and essential condition that the State was 
to reserve all of its sovereign powers, including the power to enact and change laws and 
taxes.  Precisely because of this broad reservation of sovereign rights, COP and XOM 
(and all other foreign participants in the AAs, for that matter) bargained with PDVSA to 
obtain protection for their investments through very specific compensation mechanisms, 
whose premises were also incorporated as essential conditions in the Congressional 
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authorisations for the projects.  But these compensation mechanisms, in turn, made 
explicit reference to a limitation of liability on the part of PDVSA, and provided that 
foreign investors would be deemed not to have suffered any adverse economic 
consequences when the price of crude oil exceeded a certain threshold level specified 
in the respective AAs.  Thus, contrary to the claims of COP and XOM, the documents 
would indicate that the Venezuelan government had the right to take the succession of 
fiscal measures at issue in the arbitrations. 
 
As far as the nationalisation of the projects is concerned, not even XOM is prepared to 
contest the fact that this came about through the exercise of a legitimate sovereign 
prerogative: ―the ICSID dispute is not over Venezuela's right to expropriate the assets of 
our Venezuelan affiliate, Mobil Cerro Negro‖.229  But it should not be forgotten that the 
Venezuelan government neither intended nor wished to take over all of the COP and 
XOM interests in the country, and that this outcome was the consequence of these 
companies‘ refusal to reduce their equity participation in the projects in the context of 
the migration initiative.230  The companies‘ intransigence left the Venezuelan 
government facing a much higher compensation bill than would otherwise have been 
the case, which renders all the more objectionable their position that the limitations 
formulae should be set aside for the purposes of calculating compensation. 
 
Such a position is tantamount to asserting that the arbitration tribunals concerned 
should ignore the Congressional authorisations for the AAs, thereby conferring upon 
COP and XOM rights that they never had in the first place and which would allow these 
companies to appropriate windfall profits for which they never bargained (and which 
mainstream economics from Ricardo onwards recognise as rightfully belonging to the 
natural resource owners).  All in all, then, the ICSID arbitrations constitute an attempt on 
the part of COP and XOM to conjure alleged breaches of treaty out of thin air so as to 
avoid the unacceptable outcomes of contractual mechanisms of their own devising. 
 
The oil companies‘ ―different perspective‖ on contract sanctity also manifests itself when 
what is at issue is their own adherence to agreements they have actually signed.  
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Consider the following example (quite well publicised, as it is a central episode in a 
chapter in Steve Coll‘s bestselling journalistic account of XOM‘s business dealings all 
over the world). After the nationalisation of XOM‘s interests in the Cerro Negro project, 
XOM and PDVSA agreed to cooperate on re-purchasing all outstanding Cerro Negro 
bonds in order to free funds belonging to both companies which were resting in 
accounts controlled by the Security Trustee of the bonds.231  PDVSA funded the bond 
re-purchase in whole and XOM duly received its share of the funds.  PDVSA, in 
contrast, did not, because unbeknownst to it, XOM had secretly (i.e. ex parte) served a 
levy upon the monies contained in PDVSA CN‘s account at 4:10 pm on December 28, 
2007 (45 minutes before the Termination Agreement became effective), ―despite the 
express representation made by the Mobil parties in the Termination Agreement that no 
order existed which would prevent the consummation of the transactions‖.232  Shortly 
after this (late afternoon) dawn raid in New York, XOM moved to obtain the worldwide 
freezing order in London and attachments on PDVSA assets from courts in The 
Netherlands, Curaçao and the Netherlands Antilles, all on an ex-parte basis.233  The 
PDVSA CN funds attached in New York were to remain frozen until early 2012, when 
they were released in order to liquidate (in part) the XOM ICC award. 
 
The notion that all may be fair in love and in war and – as certain oilmen see it – in the 
purported defense of shareholder value, comes across even more clearly in the 
notorious case of XOM‘s underpayment of royalties in some prolific offshore gas leases 
found in waters under the jurisdiction of the state of Alabama.  Throughout a protracted 
and convoluted litigation process, the state of Alabama asserted that ―Exxon [had] made 
a fraudulent decision to misrepresent and continually suppress the fact that it was 
underpaying on the royalties it owed, with the hope and expectation that its breach 
would pass undetected and thus unredressed by the State‖.234  Ultimately, after a 
couple of iterations, the Alabama Supreme Court determined that XOM had not been 
guilty of fraud, but only of breach of contract deriving from its interpretation of certain 
clauses in the leases, notably those relating to the netting of allowable costs.235  The 
manner in which XOM construed these cost-netting provisions (described here in the 
words of Judge Tracy McCooey, who denied XOM any post trial motions after the 
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second time the case was tried in court) ought to resonate with readers who, by now, 
have become familiar with XOM‘s take on the compensation limitation clauses in the 
Venezuelan AAs: 
 
Although Exxon knew it did not have a legitimate basis for saying that "actually 
drilling wells on the leased area" could be "interpreted" to mean drilling a well 
somewhere on the unitized area, that is just what Exxon ultimately did ...  
Notwithstanding that many ... expenses were not even arguably "direct expenses 
incurred in actually drilling wells on the leased area," Exxon suggested that, because 
they were not "expressly excluded," these expenses could somehow be "included" in 
the cost of drilling a well on the leased area236 ... It took the position that a well drilled 
on another leased area was a well drilled on this leased area; and that building 
something else, somewhere else, was part of the direct expense of actually drilling a 
well on this leased area. Exxon did not inform the State of its position. Instead, it 
simply withheld royalties under the auspices of the payout provision as if it had in fact 
incurred the relevant expenses in drilling wells on the leased area, reporting to the 
State based on the reduced payout royalty on the two leased areas without wells.237  
 
Also instructive in terms of understanding XOM‘s overall approach to judicial 
proceedings is Judge McCooey‘s appraisal of XOM‘s behaviour throughout two trials 
(and numerous associated hearings): 
 
This Court feels impelled to note the egregious nature of Exxon's misconduct, which 
sharply departs from good faith compliance with the rules of discovery and from what 
the Court considers fair practice ... The record is now all too clear. And it is appalling. 
Exxon "gamed" the State's discovery requests, defied the terms of this Court's order, 
silently reneged on its representations to the Court, and held the requested 
information in its hip pocket until it saw fit ... to use it in assailing the basis for the 
jury's verdict ... The Court is at this point convinced that Exxon bound itself neither by 
rule nor by conscience in resisting the State's lawful efforts in this litigation to 
investigate, expose, and remedy its misconduct ... Exxon has proven to be 
incorrigible in its secrecy and misdirection ...238 
 
From the characterisation above, it is safe to assume that Judge McCooey would not 
have been particularly surprised by the judicial tactics that XOM employed in order to 
pressure Venezuela to accede to its compensation demands, notably its covert pursuit 
of worldwide freezing orders and attachments in support of outlandish damages claims.   
 
It is ironic that the damages claims which XOM submitted in London should have been 
calculated without any discounting to present value, given that in 2005, XOM had 
argued before the Alabama Supreme Court that ―the State ... [had] consistently 
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manipulated and inflated ... [its damages] figures in indefensible ways‖, among other 
things by ―ignor[ing] the time value of future cash flows [i.e. using a discount rate of 
zero] despite ... [the] ostensible purpose of generating a comparison with a punitive 
award that is to be assessed in today's dollars‖.239  And what conclusions are to be 
drawn from the gamut of damages calculations that XOM submitted in ICC-related 
proceedings alone (―the US$12 billion calculated by Mr. Plunkett, the US $10 billion set 
forth in the Summary of Claimant's Position in the Terms of Reference, the US$7.6 
billion originally calculated by one of the Claimant's external experts, the US$6.45 to 
US$6.85 billion ... claimed [in the final pleadings to the ICC tribunal]‖)?240  In this 
instance, XOM‘s counsel before the Alabama Supreme Court provides useful guidance: 
 
the State [of Alabama] and its lawyers have approached the potential harm question 
in a totally unprincipled,  manipulative, and unconscionable way. The State's various 
potential harm estimates ranged in the first trial from $1.8 billion ... to between $650 
million and $3.75 billion ... and in the second trial from $255 million to $930 million ... 
The absurdly wide range of these calculations – approximately $3.5 billion – is alone 
enough to confirm that these figures are wildly speculative, plucked from thin air, and 
obviously intended for the sole purpose of parading huge figures before the jury as 
fodder for lawyer exhortations.241 
 
There is little that can be added to these mordant observations with respect to XOM‘s 
conduct vis-à-vis Venezuela, beyond highlighting the even wider range of XOM‘s own 
estimates of damages (around 6,000 MMUSD,  80 per cent wider than the one XOM 
took such great exception to in Alabama), and the considerably greater magnitude of 
the XOM claims, relative to the ―huge figures‖ that Alabama had calculated. 
 
From the above, it should be clear that there is nothing, either in law or in fact, that 
supports the uncritical and pervasive acceptance among governmental actors and the 
general public of the premise that the ultimate motive behind the COP and XOM 
arbitrations against Venezuela and PDVSA is the defense of the principle of sanctity of 
contract.  Once again, these arbitrations are best understood as an attempt on the part 
of these multi-national companies to exact an immense windfall as a way of cashing out 
from a country whose politics they had come to dislike for a variety of reasons, through 
the expedient of enlisting arbitration tribunals to re-draft terms and conditions that might 
have been exceptionally favourable for the companies initially, but which were left 
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looking considerably less rich by an unforeseen development: ―the oil price spike that 
began in 2002 and that, though with some intermittence, continues‖.242  In effect, the 
companies want to revisit, with the benefit of hindsight and out to the full term of their 
original agreements, the issue of ―how the economic benefits of this oil price spike must 
be distributed‖243, despite the fact that the governing documents made it crystal clear 
that the Venezuelan government could appropriate all the economic benefits beyond a 
certain specified price. 
   
This roundabout attempt on the part of COP and XOM to enlist international arbitrators 
as drafters-in-hindsight, however objectionable it might be in strictly legal terms, seems 
to make a good deal of economic sense (even though it is neither cheap nor assured of 
success), given that the costs involved are a vanishingly small fraction of the potential 
rewards, while the potential fallout from frivolous suits is negligible.244  Furthermore, and 
perhaps even more importantly, the claims are also meant to have a demonstration 
effect on other oil producers, conveying the message that their respective governments 
should think carefully before doing anything that oil companies such as these might take 
exception to, whether or not it affects genuine vested rights.  The rationale behind the 
latter motivation can be discerned in the following exchange between the U.S. 
ambassador to Kazakhstan and an XOM representative, at a time of particularly tense 
conversations involving the Kashagan Production Sharing Agreement (PSA):  
 
ExxonMobil Kazakhstan's Government Relations and Public Affairs Director Patricia 
Graham ... told the Ambassador on January 11 [2008] that ExxonMobil will not 
change its position. ExxonMobil is a world-wide operation, she said, and cannot 
afford to create a precedent in Kazakhstan that will affect it elsewhere. She said that 
progress has been made on other issues, but not on the question of establishing the 
fair market value of an increased ownership share for KMG [KazMunaiGas]. Graham 
indicated that ExxonMobil does not have any new ideas to offer and she expects 
"tough negotiations‖.245 
 
But while it may be true that in economic terms and on a micro (i.e. company-specific) 
scale, these arbitrations have a relatively favourable risk/reward balance, at a macro 
level and from a political standpoint, things look considerably more fraught. 
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By way of conclusion: the wider political meaning(s) of the Venezuelan arbitrations 
 
In 2006, shortly before the migration of associations got underway in Venezuela,  
heralding the present era of mega-arbitrations, Joshua Robbins hailed ―the dramatic 
proliferation of bilateral investment treaties‖, which in his view had done a great deal to 
attenuate the ―conflict between developed, capital-exporting states and developing, 
capital-importing states ... thereby encouraging increased flows of foreign direct 
investment to developing countries‖.  Robbins attributed this salutary effect in part to the 
fact that ―[m]odern investment treaties typically empower foreign investors to enforce 
their own treaty-generated substantive rights by initiating international arbitral 
proceedings directly against the host state‖, but he conceded that this system had ―also 
given rise to a growing number of rather creative claims by investors‖.246 
 
At the time that Robbins was penning these lines, such creative claims – involving a 
variety of economic activities and industries – were already giving rise to tensions and 
anomalies that put the global system for the protection of investments under some 
stress.247  However, the stress levels associated with the creativity underlying the COP 
and XOM cases against Venezuela – much in evidence throughout this paper – are of 
an altogether different intensity, on account of the magnitude of the claims.  Indeed, the 
claims, and even a small percentage of them, are actually too big – quite apart from too 
flimsy – to succeed, in terms of the integrity and viability of the dispute resolution 
system.  At the moment, states still seem to be reconciled to the idea that, for a variety 
of technical and practical reasons, this system is stacked objectively against them.248 
However, it would be difficult for states to continue tolerating this situation in the face of 
unprecedented awards in favour of the claimants in these cases. 
   
The legal disputes and contract renegotiations involving countries such as Algeria, 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Venezuela are a direct consequence of the behaviour of the oil 
market from 2000 onward.  The oil price explosion revealed the hollowness of 
predictions such as Michael Klein‘s, in the sense that a supply cornucopia would 
inevitably materialise on the back of the worldwide adoption of ultra-liberal oil policies.  
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The asymmetrical and fiscally disadvantageous outcomes embedded in certain 
contracts became simply intolerable as oil prices shot up.  In the case of Venezuela, for 
example, on the eve of the reinstatement of the statutory royalty rate for the Orinoco 
upgrading projects (October 2004), fiscal receipts from these projects were so paltry – 
at a grand total of USD 0.25 per barrel – that, even though oil prices were already at 
record-breaking levels, there would have been no discernible impact on public finances 
had all the active upgraders ceased to operate.  Likewise, in Kazakhstan, as a result of 
catastrophic cost overruns in the Kashagan project, the government was looking at 
receiving a similarly catastrophic grand total of 2 percent of the oil produced for at least 
the first decade of production (after a start-up delay of at least 8 years, into the bargain), 
from an output that was supposed to reach 1.5 million barrels per day at peak.249 
 
In the light of this kind of situation, it is not surprising that governments such as these 
should have decided to marshal their limited resources (financial but even more so 
managerial) towards the restructuring of legacy projects, as no new project could offer a 
payoff remotely comparable to that which could be obtained by rebalancing 
outrageously lopsided agreements at a time of extraordinarily high oil prices.  In the 
specific case of Venezuela, as we have seen, the restructuring of AAs involved projects 
whose very authorizations contained conditions specifying that the State reserved all of 
its sovereign powers.  But similar compulsory restructuring has been very much the 
order of the day even in the case of many contracts, licenses or concessions that did 
not provide for such explicit safeguards of their sovereign prerogatives. 
 
Consider the following announcement put out by the holder of an important concession 
which was the subject of a ―migration‖ initiative remarkably similar, both in conception 
and execution, to Venezuela‘s:  
 
[The Concessionaire] has reached an agreement with the … Government. The 
agreement changes and increases taxation of income under the … concession 
until its expiry in 2012 [and] the Government will receive a 20% share of the profit 
[profit sharing was zero up until this point].  Simultaneously, the concession is 
extended to 2042 with the … Government joining [the consortium exploiting the 
concession] with an ownership share of 20% as of 2012 without payment. 
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[The Concessionaire] has found it unreasonable to negotiate the existing agreement 
under pressure of new legislation, but found it prudent to accept a complete 
solution which should ensure a continued economically and for the society proper 
development of the oil and gas fields in question, also after 2012.250 
 
These measures, which increased government take on the gross income generated by 
the concession from 41 per cent (for the 2000-2003 period) to 66 per cent (for the 2004-
2011 period),251 were adopted less than 7 months after the legislature had asked the 
executive for a report ―outlining the possibilities of … ensuring that the State gains a 
larger share of the values in connection with the present and future exploitation of the oil 
and gas resources‖.252 
 
At first glance, this chain of events might seem a good example of the ―demonstration 
effect‖ that the fiscal measures implemented in Venezuela over the 2004-2008 
timeframe have had around the world.  Appearances, however, are deceptive.  As a 
matter of fact, the restructuring of this particular concession was undertaken when the 
oil price spike was just beginning (2003), way before the Venezuelan government 
reinstated the statutory royalty rate for the Orinoco projects.  Furthermore, it was carried 
out by the government of a country not usually included among the standard-bearers of 
radicalism.  The concession in question was that held by the Dansk Undergrunds 
Consortium (DUC), granted originally on 8 July 1962 to A.P. Møller–Mærsk A/S for the 
exploration and production of hydrocarbons throughout the whole of the landmass and 
territorial waters of Denmark. 
 
It is highly significant that it should have been a Danish Liberal-Conservative coalition 
government which fired the first salvo in the ongoing round of restructuring stemming 
from the post-2000 oil price spike, as this neatly underscores the fundamental flaw in 
the suits that international oil companies have promoted against Venezuela and other 
states.  In a nutshell, such suits are predicated on denying these states the exercise of 
sovereign prerogatives which are jealously guarded by the governments of the home 
countries of companies like COP, XOM, Total, RD/Shell, BP, Eni, and Mærsk.  Consider 
the following example: in the United Kingdom, in 1993, royalties were abolished and an 
exemption from PRT granted to all fields developed after that year, which meant that all 
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such fields enjoyed the same fiscal arrangements as a bakery or a bike shop from that 
point until the year 2002, when the British government decided to introduce an 
additional Supplementary Charge of 10 per cent to the Corporation Tax rate applicable 
only to ‗ring-fenced‘ profits from oil and gas exploration activities.  In other words, for 
nearly 10 years, the British government was content to receive a compensation of 
precisely zero from the exploitation of certain hydrocarbon resources belonging to the 
Crown (i.e. although the income they generated came from the liquidation of a non-
renewable Crown patrimony, Corporation Tax was the only levy these fields had to pay, 
like any other ―ordinary‖ business).  However, it was always made absolutely clear that 
such a situation could change, since "no British government will give up its sovereign 
rights in the fiscal area to make adjustments as it deems necessary".253  Subsequently, 
upward adjustments have indeed been made from time to time. The Supplementary 
Charge was raised to 20 per cent in 2006 and again to 30 per cent in 2011, and since 
2008, the corporation income tax rate for oil activities has been left at 30 per cent, 
though the general rate of Corporation Tax has been progressively reduced to 21 per 
cent – as has been deemed necessary by the governments of the day (and, needless to 
say, without previous consultation with the companies affected).254 
 
The increases to the Supplementary Charge left oil companies active in the UK North 
Sea reaching for the smelling salts, not least because they lacked any legal recourse 
whatsoever against them.255  Among the aggrieved companies was Mærsk Oil, but its 
spirited protests against the measures availed it nought, as indeed had its preceding 
protests against the restructuring of the DUC concession in Denmark (officially referred 
to as the 2003 North Sea Agreement).256  In contrast, Mærsk (and its partner Anadarko) 
successfully challenged an Algerian windfall profits tax (the Taxe sur les profits 
exceptionnels or TPE), enacted in August 2006.  This is attributable primarily to the fact 
that, thanks to the existence of an Algeria-Denmark BIT and the arbitration clause in 
their PSA with Sonatrach (the Algerian NOC), they were able to bring simultaneous 
multi-billion dollar claims against Algeria and Sonatrach in international arbitration 
tribunals (in a two-pronged litigation strategy redolent of that pursued by XOM against 
Venezuela and PDVSA), rather than in Algerian courts.257   
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The economic effects of both the migration of the DUC concession and the TPE were 
not hugely different (although the burden of TPE was heavier, which is not surprising 
given the much higher productivity of Algerian oil and gas fields).  This similarity extends 
to the political plane, of course, since prima facie it is difficult to grasp how one of these 
two measures could somehow constitute an undisputed and legitimate exercise of a 
state‘s sovereign police powers, whereas the other allegedly amounted to an 
internationally unlawful act.  This reflection leads to an obvious question: had Sonatrach 
been a party to the DUC concession, would it have had grounds to take the Danish 
government to arbitration under this same BIT?  The answer, if the two ICSID Vattenfall 
cases against Germany are anything to go by, would appear to be yes.  But, of course, 
the Danish signatories of this BIT never lost any sleep over such an eventuality, for the 
simple reason that they expected that all the investment flows protected by the treaty 
would be going in one direction, and one direction only (and there would almost 
certainly not be a PSA with a Danish state entity giving guarantees against sovereign 
measures that might be taken by the government).  This aspect of the Algeria-Denmark 
BIT is thoroughly representative of BITs in general, and therein precisely lies the rub: for 
the most part, the only thing that was ever meant to be bilateral about BITs is their 
name, because the ethos of the whole investor-state international dispute resolution 
system that these treaties underpin was to constrain the freedom of governmental 
action, but only in certain countries.  In a nutshell, the proliferation of BITs has given rise 
to a situation where the essential identifying trait of sovereignty – to be the highest unit 
of decision and action in a given territory, not subject to the will of any superior instance 
("the supreme power of enacting and derogating laws ... that is to say, to give laws to 
each and every one and receive them from no one", in Jean Bodin‘s classic formulation) 
– continues to hold and be true for some governments, but not for others.258   
 
The analysis of BITs from a juridical viewpoint has called forth the spillage of rivers of 
ink, but is rather beside the point here because, to paraphrase Keynes, this concluding 
section is "concerned ... not with the justice of the treaty ... but with its wisdom and its 
consequences".259  And as regards the current state of the world petroleum industry and 
oil market, the main consequence of a two-decade-long spell of BIT-underpinned 
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hydrocarbons governance, effectively predicated on stripping many resource-rich 
nations of their rights of taxation and eminent domain, seems to be a worldwide dearth 
of investment opportunities involving anything other than difficult or inferior prospects 
(relative to likely future requirements, especially of crude oil), which manifests itself 
most tellingly by way of very high oil prices.  To an extent, this is a consequence of the 
fact that a growing number of countries have had to continue focusing their attention 
and resources on restructuring and renegotiation (and their unavoidable handmaiden, 
litigation), which in turn has led to a reduction in the number of projects "in the pipeline" 
in such countries, and has even shut some oil companies out from some highly 
prospective areas.  There are many other places where no restructuring has occurred 
(or is even likely to occur), and yet investment flows there have also suffered, albeit on 
account of the calamitous economic and political sequels derived from the wholesale 
relaxation of fiscal terms in countries for whom, as Silvan Robinson put it so well, the 
overhead costs of the oil industry include "the cost of running the whole country".260  
Thus, the fact that 2011 was the first year in history when the international price of 
crude averaged over 100 USD/B is an indicator that confirms once again, as Keynes 
warned in vain, that ―[t]here are ... arguments, which the most obtuse cannot ignore, 
against a policy of spreading and encouraging further the economic ruin of ... 
countries‖.261 
 
But could it be that this cautionary recommendation has now been rendered irrelevant 
by the unfolding – and totally unforeseen, but no less welcome for that – oil and gas 
shale revolution in North America (which is likely to spread to other countries)?  After all, 
a mere handful of years after getting underway, this revolution has radically transformed 
both the US natural gas market (which has swung from a situation of impending 
shortage to one of surplus), and the US petroleum market (where flows of imported 
crude oil have shrunk  markedly).  However, the very high variable lifting costs of non-
conventional hydrocarbons makes their output contingent not only on persistently high 
price levels but also on a measure of stability prevailing in the world petroleum market 
(otherwise, extreme price volatility will wreak havoc on the balance sheets of companies 
with a large exposure to non-conventional hydrocarbon plays).  This set of conditions 
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will, of necessity, continue generating very large rents in prolific conventional 
hydrocarbons provinces with low to moderate production costs.  And attempts to deny 
the resource owners the right to collect such rents will make it more rather than less 
difficult for oil and gas output to keep pace with rising worldwide demand, in a way that 
maintains prices within reasonable bounds and, crucially, gives a chance to hundreds of 
millions of consumers in developing countries to emerge from poverty (quite apart from 
allowing consumers in developed countries to continue enjoying the standards of living 
they have become accustomed to).  Simply put, just as taxation without representation 
is a byword for tyranny, access without taxes is a recipe for political paralysis, endless 
litigation, and obstacles in the path of smooth investment and production.  For all their 
thirst for abundant and cheap oil and gas, and the talk from oil executives about an 
endless succession of attractive investment prospects (especially non-conventional 
ones, of late), both oil companies and consuming country governments alike (but 
especially the latter) need to reconcile themselves with the ideas that resource owners 
have to be remunerated with a fair price and that they cannot be denied the sovereign 
prerogative of taxing windfall gains.  After all, as Chancellor of the Exchequer George 
Osborne so devastatingly put it when challenged by standard bearers for the oil 
companies to explain both the justice and the wisdom of increasing direct levies on oil 
and gas companies in Great Britain in 2011: ―It is worth bearing in mind that this oil and 
gas is not theirs. It is ours, as a nation‖.262 
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